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Chapter I Introduction 
Our task was to analyse in qualitative and, if possible, quantitative terms the 
economic costs incurred in trans border business activity (TBA) in the Community 
which are caused by divergent and/or discriminatory laws and regulations. Our 
brief was limited to manufacturing industries. 
We use the term "trans border business activity" in contradistinction to arms-
length trade and define it as any relationship between two firms in different coun-
tries linked in a long-term contractual relationship, and each of which carry out 
at least two functions with some autonomy from each other (e.g. selling; produc-
tion; research). Only one of these functions need to be the object of a special con-
tract. 
The link is often, but not necessarily, accompanied by equity holdings, e.g. 
a subsidiary or a joint venture. Our empirical sample was largely limited to these 
two forms of TBA. 
In identifying obstacles to TBA we did not limit ourselves to company law 
and related issues, but tackled the problem from the standpoint of enterprises. 
The broader question therefore became: in what way does regulatory diversity in 
Europe either discourage firms from engaging in TBA; or cause significant extra 
costs, relative to purely national operations, when they do. 
Methodology 
Our methodology required the scaling up of micro-economic insights to 
macro-economic consequences. These insights were derived from actors (both 
first hand through interviews; and second hand from academic surveys of business 
behavior); and from academic analysis on the nature of modern industrial organi-
sation. Only at one level, i.e. the costs of "Non-Europe" to firms engaging in trans-
border business, was direct observation conceivable. Even here, given the time 
constraint, we relied on estimates of business executives interviewed. Interviews 
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also served to identify the chief obstacles to TBA, and their micro-economic ef-
fects on company performance. 
Our empirical work was based on a standardised interview of some 70 com-
panies in four countries (D, GB, F, I) which (collectively) had subsidiaries (or par-
ents) in most Member States. In addition, we interviewed experts in national and 
EEC industrial federations and others with a working experience of our area of 
enquiry. 
The key to our analytical approach is contained in Figure 1, which we re-
use, with variants, throughout this report. We start from the assumption that the 
potential benefits of a contractual link between two Community firms vary from 
very high to negative. This is the sloping curve on the Y -axis. 
Coopera~lon 
benef'it.s f'roft + 
TBA 
co 
TBA 
Figure 1 
. ,_.__ 
· co~rat.ian ctu. 
: t.o non-Eurap• 
These potential benefits are reduced by diseconomies in management and 
production which are caused by non-Europe. This is the part of reality one can 
actually observe (Chapter II), and which we tried to "measure" (point Co). Multi-
plied by the number ofTBA cases actually existing in the Community, these costs 
are represented by the integral A in our graph. Chapter III presents the results of 
our attempts at quantification. 
There is a point - BM - where these Euro-caused costs become larger than 
the benefits of what would otherwise be profitable cases ofTBA. This creates in-
tegral B, a theoretical construct which we cannot directly observe although we 
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have ample empirical evidence that it exists. Integral B contains the "might-have-
beens" of European industrial cooperation which were discouraged by non-Eu-
rope. To measure the cost of this loss we have developed a "theory" of the bene-
fits of TBA adapted to the concrete situation of the Community today, defining 
the costs as the reciprocal, i.e. non-realised benefits. We discuss these opportunity 
costs in Chapter IV. 
Integral C represents that part of industry where TBA would not make sense 
even in a Europe with uniform regulations for business. These are firms, or acti-
vities, with local markets and no need for outside technology or components, e.g. 
brick making; or small and very specialised firms who are in effect global monop-
olists in their particular niches: certain machine tool and instrument makers for 
instance. 
Chapter II Findings from the business survey 
Interviews were conducted in four major countries on the basis of a stand-
ardised interview. They were conducted between September 3 and November 11, 
1987, and lasted from 1 1/2 hours to seven hours. They usually involved several 
of the following executives: 
Chief executive Head of the legal department 
Acquisitions manager Export manager 
Finance manager Logistics manager 
In order to increase the chance of making valid comparisons even with very 
small samples (15-20 companies in each country), we tried to set up interviews 
with companies from a limited number of sectors: 
automobiles 
pharmaceuticals 
textiles 
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In addition we interviewed several companies from the food industry, two 
computer manufacturers, a chemical company, a major rubber producer, and pro-
ducers of professional and consumer electronics. 
A third break-down planned in our sample, in addition to the sectoral and 
national one, was that between large companies and SMEs. Here, too, we obtained 
robust findings of significant differences. 
1. Individual obstacles 
1.1 Industrial policy 
In this first item we strayed furthest from our brief to examine regulatory 
obstacles, as we are dealing here above all with the discretionary application of 
national regulation. We were interested in such things as cut-off from (para-)sta-
tal credit lines; discrimination in R&D support and in access to procurement mar-
kets for "foreign" subsidiaries; pressures to increase local content; etc. Our find-
ings can be summarised as follows: 
There was little hard evidence that governments discriminated widely against 
subsidiaries with foreign parents as regards access to R&D funds. However, gain-
ing access to national programmes sometimes necessitated an extra effort to per-
suade authorities of the contribution to employment and exports; and the discre-
tionary nature of decision-making left an (only slightly discouraging) margin of 
uncertainty. 
However, national R&D programmes may be discontinued altogether if a 
whole sector passes into "foreign" hands (consumer electronics in Germany). On 
the other end of the scale, a country building up a strategic technology from scratch, 
i.e. one previously dominated by foreign technology, may practise outright dis-
crimination against foreign-owned subsidiaries (telecom in Italy). 
Some countries with inward investment controls (e.g. Spain) may make the 
take-over of attractive companies conditional on the simultaneous take-over of a 
lame duck. 
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As regards procurement, local content (employment) considerations were 
more important than ownership. Exceptions are newly established subsidiaries 
(often in hi-tech areas) who have not yet acquired a national"smell" and estab-
lished working relationships with the bureaucracy. 
Odd cases of "local content" maximisation could be found in the pharmaceu-
tical industry, where price controls can be manipulated to that end. In Belgium, 
it was charged, authorities "rewarded" local production with higher prices. In Bri-
tain, it was suggested by non-British companies, price controls are related to total 
investment, including R&D. This led European companies to "overinvest" in Brit-
ish R&D activities: with 4% of the world market, Britain accounted for 10% of 
world research. 
Non-Europe's competitive national industrial policies encouraged otherwise 
non-economic local production not just in these cases, and in the procurement 
case mentioned earlier, but also because of export credits. Thus German firms 
may upgrade local content in France in order to benefit from more generous ex-
port finance. On the other hand, products from truly integrated operations may 
fall below the local content barrier in any country, and hence be excluded from 
export credits, causing a competitive disadvantage from being "European". 
More generally, some companies complained bitterly of the political risk in-
volved in "going European" without the support of a "government" at that level. 
In one case, a company instituted an across-the-board cut of employment of 10% 
in all its subsidiaries to forestall charges of "job-killing". This economically inef-
ficient step is the politically induced cost of the private sector doing on its own 
what the EC is trying in rationalising the steel sector. 
1.2. Company law and taxation 
Non-Europe in the field of company law, including accounting standards and 
fiscal law, were the single most important source of both high start-up costs and, 
more importantly, of dead-weight administrative costs and sub-optimal location 
of plant and use of resources in general. 
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Most broadly we can distinguish between: 
different accounting practices, with considerable administrative costs of 
"translation" and integration for central managment control; and 
the administrative costs, and effects on company flexibility, of "fiscal suspicion" 
which sees any transfer of assets and current payments, and of profits 
themselves, as "hidden profit distribution", i.e. an opportunity for tax evasion. 
Auditing 
Different auditing standards (e.g. historical cost vs. replacement cost ac-
counting, adjustments for currency changes,etc.) are mainly a problem for inte-
grated European multinationals (EMs). The administrative problem is magnified 
by the fact that companies' internal accounting (controlling) is coloured by exist-
ing legal auditing systems. Most large companies therefore have to produce three 
sets of figures: those conforming to the national requirements of the parent com-
pany, and which include the consolidated (i.e. "translated") accounts of subsi-
diaries; national accounts for each subsidiary; and a standardised, firm-specific 
system used by all units for controlling purposes. The work involved in producing 
legally required accounts is sometimes complicated by different reporting dates 
and periods in different Member States. 
While some of the cost of "translation" can be handled by the appropriate 
software, experts are needed in both subsidiaries and parent companies to fine 
tune the system. Fees for legal consultants and, of course, external auditors, are 
substantial. The Fourth Company Law Directive dealing with accounting stand-
ards was mentioned only by one company as having improved the situation. 
Taxes 
The problems caused by "fiscal suspicion" and beggar-thy- neighbour at-
tempts by national tax authorities to maximise their share of an EMs total tax lia-
bility have much graver consequences. They do not only cause administrative costs 
but influence locational decisions regarding group administration, R&D, and pro-
duction. 
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The root cause of fiscal suspicion are above all differences in profit taxes, 
including structural elements such as R&D allowances etc. Companies are sus-
pected to use transfer prices to maximise tax liability in the most favorable country. 
There is no doubt that this suspicion is sometimes justified, although even then 
there is a cost (of manipulation) to the firm; and a dead-weight loss to the econ-
omy. 
Responses, notably regarding the desirability of a unified European com-
pany law, differed according to whether one talked to the tax specialists (notably 
external consultants) who rather enjoyed the game of"arbritrage"; and executives, 
notably oflarge companies, who recognised the cost to company management and 
planning imposed by fiscal suspicion. Moreover, a large part of the energies of tax 
lawyers were simply devoted to avoiding double taxation. 
Thus, one French EM had to institute a complex system of cost-accounting 
at the production level to satisfy German authorities of the bona-fides of the prices 
charged to its German subsidiary. Dit> a large German electronics company to 
satisfy Italian authorities. In addition, companies complained about the periodic 
and prolonged (up to 8 months) presence of controllers on the premises of espe-
cially German subsidiaries. 
Another company pointed out that national requirements on transfer prices 
were inconsistent (e.g. as regards short-term variations of exchange rates), so that 
the company had to be in an illegal situation somewhere. In fact, "Europe would 
grind to a halt if national legislation were fully applied". Living with such ambi-
guities, however, is both costly and highly unnerving to executives. 
The problem of transfer prices sometimes intersected with that of different 
product standards, since "home" and "export" prices for the same product could 
differ because of different specifications. 
Many companies complained of the difficulty of charging its subsidiaries for 
central R&D expenditure. This is particularly awkward in view of the fact that, 
from an economic point of view (see chapter III below), technology transfer and 
R&D scale economies are among the most useful features of TBA. 
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Particular scrutiny (including at customs) is reserved for the transfer price 
of software. It was much easier, our respondents claimed, for an independent firm 
to "export" software at its just value than for an integrated TBA. Software makes 
up significant proportions of the value of an increasing number of products (ma-
chine-tools + -30%; telematics (50% +);it is also the form in which production 
know-how is often transferred. If the full value of this 11Component11 cannot be 
charged by the main technology holder in an integrated company or a joint ven-
ture, serious distortions result. I.a. a firm may choose to sell"embodied" software, 
i.e. a hard product, rather than utilising local production opportunities. 
Yet a third consequence of suspicion towards "immaterial'' transfers was the 
difficulty for central management companies to level a management charge on 
their subsidiaries. This again inhibits economies of scale in administration; and 
the development of Euro-centric rather than national loci of planning and know-
how. 
As regards Italy, many of these problems were accentuated by a second mo-
tive for suspicion, i.e. the circumvention of capital controls. This not only in-
fluenced current TBAs, but also business expansion (i.e. acquisitions; for more 
detail see the notes on individual countries, below). 
In all, the extra administrative costs imposed by different auditing and fis-
cal systems was estimated at 10-30% of the relevant departments. This, to us, sur-
prisingly high figure was cited by all large European companies. A partial excep-
tion were British companies which did not, by and large, engage in truly integrated 
operations. (See also section 3, below). 
Many companies cited the impossibility of reducing tax liability by off-set-
ting losses in one branch by profits in another as very costly to their operations. 
One particularly serious obstacle to business expansion is the practice of tax 
authorities to levy capital gains taxes on firms taken over or merged, i.e. treating 
this as a case of "realised assets". The holding company, with both partners re-
maining legally in existence, is a clumsy substitute for a true merger. An excep-
tion are the Netherlands, where (foreign) companies can obtain a "ruling" before 
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a merger. That still leaves the problem of negotiating their exit from the previous 
tax residences. 
A last item under the heading of company law and fiscal suspicion relates to 
the rigidity of many national company statutes. The growing preference of Euro-
pean multinationals to choose the Netherlands as headquarters had less to do with 
tax advantages (dividends}, and more with the flexibility and pragmatism of Dutch 
laws, not least as regards the ability of holding companies to levy and transfer im-
material income, e.g. from royalties, trade marks, etc. Some firms have transferred 
from tax-friendly Luxemburg for this reason. Flexibility also extends to such things 
as voting rights - important in joint ventures -where tailor-made agreements be-
tween partners are accepted, provided they are spelled out in writing. 
1.3. Product/production standards 
While this problematique is the object of specialised studies in the Cost of 
Non-Europe project, our interest related particularly to its effect on integrated 
business planning in Europe. 
We found that some large firms devoted 1/3 of their R&D budgets to the 
adjustment of their technology to different national settings. This obviously re-
duces the scale advantages from R&D which would otherwise accrue to integrated 
European companies. Alternatively, the innovative output of a given R&D effort 
would be greater. This problem applies particularly to telecommunication on the 
one hand and mass-produced electronic components on the other. It has little re-
levance in industrial plant and machinery made to customer specifications. 
As regards product standards, even the most marginal divergences (e.g. la-
belling requirements) prevented, at the very least, efficient, i.e. centralised and 
flexible, stock management. Stock management, including the option to have a 
central European warehouse in a post-11 199211 world, was particularly important to 
relatively small multinationals with specialised products (e.g. hospital supplies). 
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As regards regulations of production, the piecemeal introduction of pollu-
tion standards in Europe caused major uncertainties in investment planning and/or 
led to distorted locational decisions. 
It is worth noting that all problems under this heading caused costs to EMs 
and rather discouraged them to increase the level of internal integration; while 
some of the same problems encouraged SMEs to seek local production partners 
to adapt their product to local standards; get type approval, etc. 
1.4. Trade Obstacles 
Again we limit our remarks to their impact on integrated business strategies. 
Border delays and uncertainties are becoming increasingly relevant as just-
in-time management of components is gaining in importance. TBA by EMs, with 
their tight logistics planning, is hampered by this even more than arms-length 
trade. While customs are one source of the problem, divergent social and techni-
cal regulation of the transportation industry was cited as an additional risk factor. 
Intra-EEC applications of COCOM controls were mentioned by many firms 
in the electronics and advanced engineering sectors. The problems were hold-ups 
at the border; difficulties in carrying out speedy repairs (spare-parts); and dif-
ferences in national COCO M lists. 
Together with the familiar deadweight administrative and resource cost of 
border-crossing (1% of value in our estimate), uncertainty penalises otherwise ef-
ficiency-enhancing forms of integrated TBA which would allow large scale econ-
omies through decentralised components manufacture. 
A particular problem is posed by Italy, which prohibits temporary imports 
of components for re-export in a chain of value-added, necessitating the admin-
istrative (fiscal, customs) registration of two sales. Dito for demonstration ma-
chines, test equipment and other temporary exports. 
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Non-Europe was also said to hamper business planning due to the discre-
tionary and varied national administration of the common external policy by dif-
ferent countries (quota enforcement). 
1.5. Social Policy 
TBA, especially within integrated businesses, requires the exchange of some 
managerial and technical personnel. This raises the question of the "portability" 
of social security benefits, notably pension schemes, which are tailored to national 
fiscal systems and/or related to public schemes. In practice, the firm must pay 
twice, raising salary costs by 10- 15%. Lack of "mutual recognition" of secondary 
and other school diplomas by dependents also reduced flexbility of technical and 
managerial staff. 
A different problem is posed by differences in technical training in Europe. 
Man/machine interfaces and production in general are designed with particular 
skill combinations in mind. Some firms spend considerable sums to train the work-
forces in their subsidiaries to conform to a particular standard, and to make com-
munication at the various technical levels possible. 
1.6. Capital and Current Transfers 
Here there were few general problems: most were country specific. One 
general problem, however, was the difficulty of gaining access to local stock-ex-
changes to finance a new subsidiary for medium-sized companies. 
Italy, among the major countries, continues to be a special case. We deal 
with it under point 3 below. The main point to make is that only large and very 
sophisticated companies can engage in genuine TBA. 
Currency risks were cited by virtually all French EMs, some of which are 
considering introducing the ECU as internal accounting unit. Complaints about 
currency risks were also occasionally made by companies in other countries. The 
extra problem raised for transfer prices has been mentioned. One German hi-tech 
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EM called for the speedy introduction of the ECU as an official means of pay-
ment. 
2. Large and small companies 
While there were important exceptions, TBA by European multinationals 
(EMs) on the one hand, and small and medium- sized enterprises on the other, 
could be clearly distinguished as follows: 
1. Large companies always engage in some form of TBA SMEs rarely do so. 
2. SMEs are above all interested in marketing, with local production an unplanned 
afterthought when it occurs, e.g. via a gradual expansion of after-sales service; 
adaption of products to local standards; or co-production with a former sales 
"agent". 
Large companies are more likely to systematically exploit cost advantages, 
notably labour and transport, and scale advantages; they are also driven by 
formal or informal local content considerations; more rarely by political 
diversification of supply risks (strikes). They also exploit investment and 
export incentives. 
3. SMEs tend to have a relatively arms-length relationship with their production 
subsidiaries abroad, using long-term contracts not very different from those 
concluded with third parties. This reflects their relative scarcity of 
management resources and, in particular, international expertise. 
Most EMs prefer a hands-on approach to management, not only in order to 
exploit all manner of technical and economic cost advantages (of which SMEs may 
be only vaguely aware); but also in order to pursue market strategies which are 
directed not only at the customers (as in the case of SMEs) but at competitors. 
Sophisticated financial management, including tax minimisation; use of capital 
markets; currency portfolio management, etc. is scarcely practised by firms with 
less than 2000 employees. 
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This makes sense in terms of relative management cost; but suggests un-
tapped opportunities for external service providers, e.g. banks, with the requisite 
economies of scale. 
3. Country variations 
United Kingdom 
The most striking peculiarity of UK companies is the extreme arms-length 
approach to management. Even world-sized companies seemed to look at their 
European subsidiaries more in terms of investment diversification than in exploit-
ing the opportunities of continental integration. Thus, for example, the expatria-
tion of staff was not an issue in any of our twenty interviews. R&D was pursued 
in parallel (duplicated) by closely related subsidiaries. "The first time we saw our 
colleagues was in the BRITE programme", according to an executive of a hi-tech 
Italian British-owned engineering subsidiary. Subsidiaries were often managed by 
special holdings with a handful of staff, headquartered in London - far from the 
manufacturing headquarters in the provinces, again confirming the financial over 
the industrial interest. 
Given the low level of integration, non-Europe was not perceived as a great 
problem for British companies engaging in TBA. 
France 
In France, hands-on management was typical even for medium- sized enter-
prises. "Expatriation" of management staff was common. There was great pride in 
being "European". In contrast to the other three countries, being merely French 
was considered provincial. Like Italy, companies in mature sectors threatened by 
both German and extra-European competition saw the European "home market" 
as the only chance for survival through economies of scale. High levels of produc-
tion integration brought out the problems of non-Europe more sharply than else-
where. 
E.R.A./PROGNOS Page 13 
- 24 -
Germany 
German firms are reluctant players in the game of TBA. Direct exports are 
generally preferred over !ocal production, except when it comes to exploiting la-
bour-cost advantages in Britain, Spain, and Portugal. Formal and informal local 
content pressures also provide an incentive to produce abroad. 
Machine-tool makers were particularly harsh in their comments about TBA 
with France, where a combination of government interference and unreliable de-
livery has produced a legacy of distrust. While state interference was a problem 
in Italy, the fact that there was not actually a government industrial policy made 
such interference less of a problem than in France. 
Italy 
Italian TBA fully confirms to the overall image of Italian industry, i.e. a pri-
vate sector struggling to thrive in spite of the State. 
As mentioned for France, large companies in the more traditional sectors 
see the extension to 11Europe11 as the only chance of remaining competitive. In 
other words, moves to rationalise European industry will not be spearheaded by 
the strongest country, Germany, but by relatively weaker competitors. 
The major problem for Italian companies were capital controls which effec-
tively prevent smaller firms from engaging in TBA. Getting permission to invest 
in a productive facility abroad is not a problem- it just takes time (3 months). Per-
mission for an increase in capital already involves more difficult negotiations. 
Most difficult of all is to get permission to create a holding abroad. Only very large 
companies can assume the cost of 11negotiating11 such a permit with the relevant 
ministries; and to prepare lengthy annual reports to those ministries, which go 
well beyond normal audit requirement. 
The combination of capital controls with controls on tax evasion, and hence 
the need to negotiate acceptable business plans with both the Finance and the 
Foreign Trade Ministries, was particularly felt to complicate life, even for large 
companies. 
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The extra-territorial application ofltalian controls is another interesting fea-
ture: furtherinvestments by Italian subsidiaries (i.e. legally French etc. companies), 
need approval from Rome. 
Chapter III Measuring the costs 
The following table serves to illustrate the methodology we used to get or-
ders of magnitudes of the costs of individual obstacles to TBA expressed in a com-
parable unit, i.e. total turnover. 
Table 1 
ONE FIRM'S COST 
(case study) 
Obstacle interview data published data assumption %of 
turnover 
Fiscal 30% due toNE fisc admin = 15% of all admin; 
administration hence NE = 5% of all admi!l. 
white collar = 50% of salary 
costs; all salary = 25% of turnover 
25: 2x5% 0.625 
Training 10 million ECU turnover=? 1/3 for diversity (NE) 0.07 
for systemic inte-
gration 
R&D 25% of total for Total R&D= 
NE 6.5% of turnover 1.6 
Location optim. 5% savings poss. divide by 2 2.5 
Transport 10 - 15 of total transport = 1 - 2% of turnover 0.2 
due toNE 
Sum 4.995 
Special case 
Unused econ- loss of 10% of$ $ market = reduce by half 2.5 
omies of scale market 1/2 of turnover (resource saving) 
Sum 7.495 
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The figures, which incidentally refer to an advanced auto components manu-
facturer, are surprisingly high; but yet higher figures could be found in state-domi-
nated sectors (see below). The high figures reflect 
- the very high "service" content of contemporary industrial production, i.e. 
administration, technology exchange, marketing, etc.; 
- the considerable - and only partially realised - economies-of-scale 
opportunities which lead many companies to engage in TBA in the first place. 
Of course, precise quantitative estimates were the exception, as most execu-
tives found it difficult to quantify e.g. hypothetical economy-of-scale gains. When 
they did quantify, however, the answers were surprisingly consistent. With these 
elements in hand we needed to make a series of - increasingly heroic - estimates 
to scale up our results to some level of sector, groups of sectors, and GNP. 
The first step was to estimate an average level of cost for each obstacle and 
each industry for each country separately. The results are not reproduced here. 
The second step involved aggregating the country results, taking into account the 
peculiarities of our not always representative samples. This was done in an itera-
tive round-table discussion among the principal interviewers. The rankings of the 
importance of various obstacles correspond roughly to 1 = less than 1% of turn-
over to 4 = 4% and above of turnover. (see table 2 overleaf) 
These figures aggregate not just apples and pears but apples and cheese. 
Thus the cost of "company law" sums both the administrative cost, and induced 
scale-diseconomies. Both averages would be higher if there had been more truly 
integrated companies in our sample. Or, taking the example of trade-barriers, the 
figures may refer to actual transport costs; difficulties for just-in-time production-
integration; or COCOM- induced problems for supplying and servicing advanced 
machine tools - problems which do not arise for more conventional producers. 
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Table 2 
pharma telec auto textiles machinery 
industrial policy 4 3-4 3 0-1 1 
company law ( 1) 2-3 2 3 0-2 2 
"social"regul. (2) 2 1-2 2 0-3 0 
techn. standards 4 4 2-3 1 1-3 
other trade barr. 2 3 2 1 1-3 
technology trade 2 1-2 0 0 0 
int. payments * * * * * 
(1) includes administrative costs and sub-optimal production 
(2) includes lay-off regulations, education, and "expatriation" 
* taken in isolation, payments restrictions ranked high only in Italy 
Leaving these caveats aside, we felt that our sectors fell into three broad 
groups: 
I Pharmaceuticals and telecommunications 
These were highly regulated and protected industries with a high incidence 
of obstacles of almost all kinds, especially "industrial policy" and "technical stand-
ards". We estimated the total cost of non-Europe to firms in this group engaging 
in TBA at 9% of turnover. 
IT Automobiles 
This group, together with firms in consumer electronics, a large rubber manu-
facturer and food processors, were hampered by industrial protection; difficulties 
to adjust the labour force in response to market shifts; economy-of-scale losses 
E.R.A./PROGNOS Page 17 
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due to quite marginal differences in technical standards; and substantial"admin-
istrative" costs if they were highly integrated. Total cost of TBA was estimated at 
6% of turnover, i.e. higher than both average profits, or average R&D expendi-
ture of firms in these sectors. 
III Textiles and machine tools 
This group had in common: high specialisation; a relatively low integration 
at the component level; subsidiaries which either served marketing and service 
purposes; or produced fairly independently parts of the product range; few prob-
lems with technical standards. Total cost of TBA = 1. 7% of turnover. 
Estimating costs by sector 
Our next step was to estimate, "on the back of an envelope", the points on 
the X-axis of our graph, i.e. the proportion of turnover in each group which was 
generated in a TBA context forming the base-line for integral A ; the proportion 
potentially suited to TBA but discouraged by non-Europe (base-line B); and the 
proportion which would remain "local" under any circumstances (C). This latter 
category included local component suppliers as well as local repair and other ser-
vices. 
Table 3: Cooperation and potential 
Industry TBA potential TBA efficient local 
pharma 
30% 40% 30% 
telec. 
40% 40% 20% 
auto 
30% 40% 30% 
auto (US --------
owned) 60% 10% 30% 
textiles, · 
-----
machinery 10% 30% 60% 
E.RA./PROGNOS Page 18 
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THE COST OF NON-EUROPE: OBSTACLES TO TRANSBORDER BUSINESS 
ACTIVITY 
CHAPTER I Introduction 
1. Objectives of the study 
The White Paper on Completing the Internal Market is largely 
concerned with the removal of remaining barriers to trade in 
goods and services, and of remaining competitive distortions to 
such trade. But other agenda items raised in the Paper -
financial services, capital movements, the free movement of 
people, and what is referred to as ·.,business cooperation" -
J 
suggest that the concept of the Internal Market, like that of 
the 1958 Treaty itself, goes well beyond liberalising trade of 
final output. The objective is 11 an integrated economic space", 
or, more technically, one of free factor movements. As the 
White Paper puts it, the aim is a Community where 
"resources, both of people and materials, and of capital 
and investment, flow in areas of greatest economic 
advantage" . 
While people, capital, and the technical knowledge imbodied in 
both, are exchanged between economic agents in arms-length 
transactions, i.e. "trade", long-term contractual relations 
between firms are generally credited with improving certain 
factors flows, notably of technology, and indeed of trade 
itself. We refer to these contractual links, especially if 
they are associated with some form of equity participation as 
"transborder business activities .. , or TBA. 
A·s technology-based competition has intensified world wide, TBA 
has grown to historically unique levels. 1 Yet such business 
cooperation is notoriously difficult to arrange across 
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frontiers. 
Part of the difficulty for cooperation lies in regulatory 
discrimination of extra-national links, stemming from company 
law, fiscal law, and even social security systems. 
The Commission of the European Communities has, for more than 
two decades, developed Directives intended to remove or 
mitigate the effects of such obstacles, with the aim of 
creating an economic space where business can optimise its 
strategic mix between arms-length and cooperative 
relationships. These efforts have been consolidated and 
expanded in the White Paper. 
This report seeks to lay the groundwork for an appreciation and 
a clearer identification of the obstacles to transborder 
business activity in Europe, and their costs. 
The question to be answered could be re-formulated more 
narrowly: what difference would it make to Europe's economic 
performance if the White Paper's agenda, headed "Creation of 
suitable conditions for industrial cooperation" were fully 
implemented? That question proved to be inadequate for our 
purpose. 
First, other parts of the White Paper, notably the chapter 
dealing with capital markets, but also the liberalisation of 
trade in goods and services are part of the relevant regulatory 
setting for doing transborder business in Europe. Secondly, 
aspects of national business regulation which have not yet been 
tackled by the White Paper, but which are seen as part of non-
Europe by businessmen, have to included in a study which relies 
heavily on a survey of business executives. Thirdly, the White 
Paper chapter on "business cooperation" pursues more than the 
goal of easing transborder business: some directives pursue 
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social control objectives which are often rejected by 
businessmen. 
2. Why European business cooperation: first questions 
The case for business cooperation is not easy to demonstrate in 
traditional, i.e. fairly narrow, economic terms. And, apart 
from a shortage of theoretical arguments, the empirical 
evidence of actual business behavior suggests a certain 
caution. The fact that the overwhelming number of cooperation 
agreements exists in either the national or the non-European 
"global" context must indicate the presence of economic forces 
a great deal more fundamental than the presistance of legal and 
fiscal obstacles within the EEC. 
Indeed, much of what is best, specialised, and competitive in 
European industry is developed within strong cooperative 
networks which are not even national but (sub-)regional: metal 
working in Baden-Wurtemberg; fabrics in the Arno valley; steel 
around Brescia; electronics in Flanders, industrial agriculture 
a round Westland (NL), etc. These vertical and horizontal 
cooperation networks work in the context of a local infra-
structure, man-power pool, technology/research infra-structure, 
marketing and procurement cooperation, the provision of 
specialised services and material inputs, and with local 
political/administrative support which is close enough to 
business to know what it is doing. 
Where regional networks are not sufficient, business 
cooperation in the national context has significantly lower 
information and transaction costs- than cooperation with 
foreigners of all kinds - independently of the kind of 
discriminatory-regulations which could be tackled by the 
Community. If such extra-national cooperation is needed, 
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according to the consensus of all academics and business 
sources interviewed, global cooperation has much to recommend 
it - in fact is seen as a key to the survival of first rate, 
world-competitive industries and services in Europe. 
Indeed, both academics 2 and industrialists interviewed agre 
that it is an old-fashioned view of European welfare and 
competitivity to cheer each time European firms link up, and 
see it as a defeat when alliances with foreign firms are 
entered into. Olivetti, Philips, Siemens are sucessful 
"European champions" because of their global presence. 
Virtually all medium-sized world-competitive firms, and many 
small ones, exhibit the same pattern. 
No trade integration without business integration 
Yet, the ease or otherwise with which European firms can 
cooperate must remain a matter for concern. At the simplest 
level, because, as noted above, transborder business activity 
is a key transmission element in the perfection of factor 
markets: of technology and know-how above all, but also of 
capital. In addition, as all empirical studies show, TBA is a 
the precondition even for efficient markets in goods, notably 
intermediate goods, components, and investment goodsi and of 
services. 
If the integration of the Third World industrial producers into 
the world economy in the 1960s owed everything to the 
substitution of direct business links for arms-length trade 3 
today TBA can help to avoid a drifting apart of high-tech 
Europe from less industrialised regions. European economic 
integration cannot thrive on arms-length trade alone. 
Secondly, TBA remains an essential, if second best and partial4 
remedy against the distortions in those Europeah product and 
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factor markets which are caused by direct (national) govern~ent 
intervention, e.g. in procurement markets, and which will 
persist even under the most optimistic assumptions on progress 
in the Internal Market agenda. The de-nationalisation of 
ownership is a pre-condition for the de-nationalisation of 
certain markets. 
Thirdly, TBA is a precondition for the restructuing of those 
European industries which so far have been locked in a sub-
optimal pattern by remaining intra-Community protectionism, and 
which will have to adjust to the larger market by 1992. Trade 
alone, we will argue, is an uncertain and slow agent of 
structural change. 
Fourthly, and perhaps uppermost in the mind of many European 
policy makers, Community firms do not only compete in a neutral 
competitive world environment, but one characterised by a 
strategic struggle for market power, by (some) giant firms 
and/or by the two other leading world economic powers. The 
agnostic attitude of economists with regard to the inernational 
pattern of business cooperation is seen as naive in this view. 
Problems of measurement 
Taking only the first three and fairly straightforward elements 
of an economic case of supporting European business cooperation 
poses serious problems of measurement. 
As regards the first argument (the role of TBA in perfecting 
the flow of factors and final output) the cost-reductions 
achieved by contractual relative to arms-length inter-firm 
relations would pave to be measured - a daunting enterprise in 
its own right - and aff-s~t by efficiency losses due to reduced 
competition. The anti-competitive effect t~kes in fact pride of 
place in most academic treatments of the subject4 . To get from 
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there to the macro-economic effects compounds complexity. 
The second argument, which sees TBA as a way around NTBs, is in 
a sense a subset of the first even if it deals with political 
rather than economic/organisational constraints on public 
markets. While this role of TBA emerges strongly from many 
empirical studies, including our own, of the reasons for 
engaging in trans-European business activities, precise 
measurement would need to adress three elements: the extent of 
market imperfections; the gains from trade foregone; and the 
extent to which TBA can remedy the situation. 
The third argument: TBA as a means of restructuring industry to 
a continental dimension is controversial, as both liberal 
economists (competition) and socialist critics (power) see it 
as inherently negative. 
TBA as the basis for a European industrial policy? 
The fourth argument which sees European TBA as an essential 
corrective in the global distribution of market power fully 
escapes any quantitative assessment. For this would require a 
long-term assessment of the intentions of the players on the 
one hand, and of the ability of (the remaining) spontaneous 
market forces in the world economy to off-set domination 
strategies on the other. 
If one sticks to the task of an objective assessment of the 
Cost of Non-Europe, it is not easy to find an academically 
respectable place for what one might call geostrategic market 
power. The phenomenon is increasingly noteds of course, but 
difficult to translate into macro-economic/welfare propositions 
whi-ch go beyond common sense. If the discussion_ is simply 
about the threat of specific monopolies headquartered abroad -
IBM, Boeing - there is an established case for {public) support 
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of countervailing power. 
In a purely national context, SMEs have long been supported in 
even the most liberal countries for similar reasons. But 
arguments for European business cooperation found in COM 
documents, and much of French academic literature, go beyond 
this and reveal two political lines of thought. 
The first runs as follows. TBA, by itself, is not a remedy 
against Europe becoming the passive object of other people's 
strategies (except in such sectors as aerospace and 
telecommunications where vulnerability is the result of almost 
deliberate fragmentation of the industry through national 
public policy. This must be remedied an equally deliberate, 
state-led effort of cooperation). As a recent study puts it, 
the international phenomenon of business cooperation 
pose, en premier lieu, la question de la validite et de la 
viabilite de la notion meme d'espace economique europeen. 
Sa coherence depend, en effet, de la mise en place de 
liaisons des firmes europeennes.jSans/ la constitution 
d'un reseau structure d'interrelations des activites 
industrielles a l'echelle europeenne, les tentatives de 
definitions et d'applications d'une politique industrielle 
comunautaire par les pouvoirs publics europeens sont 
denuees de sens et d'efficacite. 6 
It is obvious that for the purposes of objective measurement of 
the "Cost on Non-Europe" the normative goal of (laying the 
basis for) a Community industrial policy can not serve as a 
yardstick. Not only is there deep political disagreement about 
the desirability of such a policy, or at least its extent; but 
any strictly economic assessment of the cost of not having such 
a policy would raise impossible methodological problems of 
assessing its future efficiency. 
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Some empirical results 
In the following we present the results of several large-scale 
investigations (most as yet unpublished) into the motives for 
business cooperation. They illustrate growing academic interest 
in the subject, but also great methodological diversity. Some 
studies include publically sponsored cooperation (aerospace), 
other exclude it. Some use data bases constituted from press 
reports; others use more or less representative samples. Some 
use questionnaires; others interviews, which again may be of 
the open kind or (sometimes dangerously) pre-structured. Some 
deal with individual country couples, others with Europe, and 
others again with the world. Thus the results, for the purposes 
of our subject, are at best illustrative. They do, however, 
provide a glimpse of the "state of the art" - and of the 
methodological and organisation problems to be solved if one 
were to attempt a truly comparative, Europe-wide study. 
The following table gives the results of the Prognos study 
cited earlier, an empirical investigation of the motives for 
cooperation of 114 French and German firms. Aerospace and 
defense cooperation is excluded. 
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Table 1 
Motives for Cooperation between French and German companies 
{frequency of motive in % of cooperation cases) 
Motive F-iniated 
Securing sources of supply 4 
Improving market access 70 
Securing market access, incl. 
to third markets (LDCs) 10 
Overcoming NTBs, of which 
standards, customs 4 
procurement/local content 10 
Completing product range, 
systems solutions 18 
Cost/efficiency criteria: 
economies of scale 
exploit prod.cost differentials 
Access to new prod./technology 
Joint R&D 
4 
20 
2 
D-iniated 
2 
60 
35 
6 
20 
25 
10 
5 
15 
2 
Source: Prognos op.cit.,p.46 (translated and re-arranged by 
EAA) 
The striking result of the Prognos study is that market access 
for the main, or a very important, motive in 2/3 of all 
cooperation cases examined (motives (1), (2), (7) of the above 
table). R&D cooperation- one of the major thrusts of the 
Community's "promotional" policies - hardly figures at all. On 
the other hand, gaining access to technology, embodied or 
o~herwise, does play a respectable role- in motivating 
cooperation. 
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Another conclusion to draw from this table, made more explicit 
below, is the fact that a great proportion of the motivation 
for cooperation would disappear if the rest of the White Paper 
agenda would be successfully implemented. This finding, 
incidentally, causes serious methodoligical difficulties when 
we try to measure the Cost of Non-Europe in relationship to a 
better "anti-monde" a completed national market where, with 
reduced obstacles to cooperation, many of the reasons for 
cooperation must be assumed to be reduced as well. 
Another study on Franco-German business cooperation comes to 
strikingly different conclusions. Although the study -
"Entreprises Allemandes et Coop~ration Industrielle ~ l'Echelle 
Europ~enne" by a team from Strasbourg University 7 stresses 
throughout the importance of the EEC.as a market, market access 
does not figure among the main reasons for cooperation given by 
a sample of 188 German firms. This is explained, i.a., by the 
fact that high quality marketing (delivery, service) is one of 
the competitive trumps of German industry, which leads German 
entreprises 
~ ne pas saboter cet atout et done ~ rejeter des formes de 
coop~ration qui se situent pres de la phase de 
commercialisation des biens et services. 8 
According to the Strasbourg study, the preferred mode of 
cooperation were 1. R&D; 2. finance (in a large sense almost 
identical with scale economies); 3. Know-how. We note these 
contradictions between the two studies to illustrate the 
difficulties of empirical research in this area. 
It is only when summarising the advantages of cooperation that 
the Strasbourg study comes closer to the Prognos results. We 
cite this li~t, because it corresponds well with other sources, 
including our own interviews; and b~cause we can equate, with a 
negative sign, the Cost of Non-Europe with the advantages of 
-11-
cooperation as seen by business. 
Advantages from Cooperation (Strasbourg findings) 9 
* cost savings: economies of scale; shorter learning curve 
* time savings: speedy introduction of new technologies 
* risk sharing 
* increased market power against foreign competitors 
* access to public procurement markets 
* overcoming NTBs 
A careful study undertaken by Prof. Balyiss and his team from 
the Centre for European Industrial Studies, University of Bath, 
on British-led joint ventures and subsidiaries in Europe 10 
broadly supports the Prognos conclusions as regards the weight 
of marketing; and the Strasbourg conclusions as to R&D. Taking 
a representative sample of 812 manufacturing companies(PLCs), 
Balyiss found that half had either JVs or subsidiaries with 
other EEC companies (and only 4% did not even export) - itself 
a valuable indication of the extent of intra-European business 
links. 
Marketing was identified as a "function" in 96% of the JVs, and 
100% of the subsidiaries. 
"Functions" of British-EEC business links in % 
Function 
Solely marketing 
Solely R&D 
R&D plus prod.jmark.*) 
Production (plus*) 
Joint ventures 
22 
6 
39 
39 
subsidiaries 
33 
0 
43 
67 
Source: Centre for Europ~an Industrial Studies, Bath 
* The JV break-dowfr is not in mutually exclusive categories: 
plus means production plus either marketing and/or R&D. For 
subsidiaries 33 + 67 equals 100. 
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The Balyiss findings also support Prognos on the low importance 
of production costs in location decisions. Firms produced 
locally for local markets because arms-length sales were 
impossible. The more "difficult" the market, the more the 
choice tended towards JVs rather than subsidiaries: having a 
(more independent) local partner was indispensible. Thus 1/3 of 
all British JVs were in Italy, but only 1/20th of the 
subsidiaries! 
This finding cannot be checked against the result of another 
study, by CEREM (Nanterre) study which provides a breakdown of 
functions not according to "target" countries, but to target 
regions (EEC, US, Japan). The table does, however, show the 
great variance as regards the cooperation behavior of different 
Community countries, both in their general preference and 
according to partner region. The data are based on a reading of 
the specialised press, and only concern four 
sectors/technologies: biotechnology; new materials; 
informatics; and aerospace. The period covered is 1980-85. 
57 -
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Table 2. 
FUNCfiONS OF COOPERATION AGREEMENTS 
in %of total of country of origin 
Partner Domestic Other EEC US Japan Total 
France 
Knowledge 07% 37% 15% 33% 22% 
Production 02% 14% 16% 33% 14% 
Market 22% .42% 53% 66% 49% 
Global 67% 31% 37% 00% 45% 
No. of agreements 44 33 73 06 165 
Great Britain 
Knowledge 19% 40% 00% 42% 29% 
Production 19% 10% 21% 14% 16% 
Market 50% 38% 45% 42% 45% 
Global 19% 25% 43% 00% 31% 
No. of agreements 10 18 18 7 62 
F.RG. 
Knowledge 00% 39% 12% 57% 35% 
Production 00% 23% 20% 28% 20% 
Market 51% 42% 57% 42% 45% 
Global 48% 23% 10% 00% 20% 
No. of agreements 4 15 9 7 40 
Italy 
Knowledge 00% 36% 17% 42% 27% 
Production 19% 04% 29% 28% 22% 
Market 21% 39% 57% 57% 53% 
Global 58% 37% 38% 28% 39% 
No. of agreements 5 19 23 7 59 
Benehu 
Knowledge 00% 60% 40% 50% 50% 
Production 00% 40% 13% 50% 25% 
Market 00% 30% 13% 50% 25% 
Global 00% 10% 40% 00% 25% 
No. of agreements 00 09 15 02 28 
Source: CEREM, Les Strategies d'Accord, op.cit.,p50. 
- 58 -
-
-14-
Mixed motives in imperfect markets 
One reason for different results in different empirical studies 
is that the form of cooperation, and its object, are often 
confused. Thus the vast study by Porter, Fuller, and Rawlinson 
on 1.444 international cooperation agreements reported in 1980 
in the Wall Street Journal 11 , uses the term "which were areas" 
of cooperation where object and form are intermixed. It is 
entirely possible that R&D cooperation or local production 
really has market objectives, i.e. they would not take place 
without market imperfections. R&D cooperation may also exist 
simply to shelter expenditure from the tax authorities. Local 
production may also be a means of (inward) technology transfer, 
as may be a simple participation in capita1, 12 etc. We 
reproduce one table from the Harvard Study not least because of 
the interesting sectoral results. 
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TA6LE3 
Sectors R&D Produc:!o~ Distribution M:uke:ingl Muitiple! 
E-q;lor:J.tion % % Sales cthe:s 
cr 
10 % % 
Agribusim:ss 12 47 OS 14 19 
Metals and c::i:::::-al.s 41 44 02 08 06 
E:le:g-j 65 29 01 02 03 
Construction 07 75 co 09 09 
Tex::iles & cloc.b.i:lg 00 40 07 18 36 
Paper and wood 10 69 10 00 10 
Chemicll.s 09 58 03 20 10 
Compute:s 17 31 13 12 28 
Other dectro:Ucs 05 33 !6 17 29 
Otherdec~d 10 40 13 21 17 
Autocobiles 05 63 04 13 16 
Ae:ospace 31 35 co 19 15 
Other machinery 04 39 08 24 26 
06.:::- manufac:o.;...cg 08 59 01 16 16 
Transportation 00 41 31 19 10 
Co=ucic:J.tions 22 33 17 00 28 
Distribution 00 24 18 42 16 
F..nanc:: 09 16 30 23 23 
Services lJ 38 1<1 24 u 
P.ll parents Pe=c::at 20% 43% 01% 15% 15% 
Number 4Z3 929 154 321 318 
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3. Cooperation as a remedy for market imperfections 
Given the conflicting and inconclusive evidence on motives for 
cooperation we have tried to come to a general view of its 
place in business strategy so as to arrive at least at a 
qualitative statement regarding its economic value. Actually, 
we had to settle for two "perspectives" under which to subsume 
the varied logic of cooperation: "market imperfection", and 
"network". The first perspective allows us to remain within 
familiar terms of economics; the second takes us to a more 
interesting level of complexity. 
As regards the first, we find it striking that in many cases 
cooperation seems to be is either a response to market 
imperfections - or an attempt to create them. Thus the )results 
of the Prognos study on business motivation can be restated, 
for analytical purposes, as follows/ 
Re-ordering the Prognos list according to analytical criteria 
we can distinguish between cooperation motives related to 
a. private market imperfections, of which 
information (lack of knowledge of local markets is, 
however, more often a motive for extra-European 
cooperation); and 
technological monopoly 
established local market power(?) 13 
b. administrative/political market imperfections 
trade controls at the border, including standards; 
national discrimination: procurement/local content 
"political" access to third markets 
c. other factor markBt imperfections 
production cost differentials 
d. economies of scale/scope 
in production 
in research 
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in marketing : customer preference for one-stop 
suppliers/solutions. 
Of the items mentioned, imperfect information is perhaps the 
most innocent of all market imperfections hut, as we shall 
paradoxically see also in the chapter on obstacles to 
cooperation, one of the most pervasive. What is meant here is 
that a local partner needed e.g. may he to keep abreast of 
local technology, help finding marketing outlets, raise 
capital, etc. 
Imperfect markets in technology are also fairly innocent, since 
they reflect a very real and widely recognised problem,) i.e. 
the conflict between a firm's desire to retain the competitive 
edge it has by virtue of its own R&D, and the general economic 
interest in the spread of that technology. Cooperation 
represents a half-way house which allows a firm continued 
control over its technology, e.g. temporary monopoly rents in 
its main markets, while allowing the technology to he used in 
other markets - for a price. This mechanism clearly gains in 
importance at a time where product cycles shorten and firms 
cannot hope (or risk) to reap the benefit of a breakthrough via 
expanding their own production. 
Arms-length trade in patents is less adapted to this world of 
acclerated technological competition. It is a slow means of 
transfer, both because of registration delays, and because the 
buyer needs an additional period of R&D to obtain a commercial 
product. Moreover, patents only partially solve the problem of 
control. 
The ease of otherwise with which cooperation can contribute to 
- 62 -
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creating a European technology market is therefore important. 
That importance is arguably greater for the seller of 
technology who may be unable to draw the full benefits from his 
R&D successes, than for the buyer, especially if its a large 
company which can meet his requirements from the vast 
storehouses of the US and Japan (at a balance of payments 
cost). The underutilisation of Europe's own stock of 
technology, and the lack of incentive (finance) for new R&D is 
a major danger. 
Insufficient access to technology, i.e. the buyers interest, is 
however a greater problem for smaller firms. While some highly 
specialised SMEs engage in global technology acquisition, 
others are constrained to look for partners closer to home. 
This applies especially to forms of technology cooperation 
which require frequent contacts between limited mangeriJl and 
technical staff. 
Lastly one must point to the possible negative impact of 
cooperation between firms with strong market power, as argued 
by Prof. Jaquemin in his study for DG IV: 
"il faut envisager la possibilit~ que l'accord de 
coop~ration en R&D facilite la coordination des d~cisions 
au niveau des prix et des ~antit~s, et favorise des 
profits monopolistiques." 1 
This brings us to the next item on our list, market power. Here 
cooperation is particularly Janus-faced from the point of view 
of raising efficiency. On the one hand, a competitor's 
established distribution network, good-will, etc. may represent 
insurmountable barriers for a new entrant. He therefore engages 
in some joint marketing and even production activity with the 
local powerholder. While there are by definition gains to both 
partners, the general economic benefits-depend on the 
circumstances. As the OECD report on Joint Ventures puts it: 
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"the establishment of a joint venture may eliminate 
competition between /the partners/ in the areas of 
activity covered by the joint venture", and 
"the joint venture gives them opportunity to collude in 
areas other than that covered by the joint venture". 15 

-20-
REFERENCES 
1. See for example "Les Strategies d'accord des Groupes de la 
CEE: Integration ou Eclatemet de L'Espace Industriel Europeen", 
Laboratoire de Recherche en Economie Appliquee (L.A.R.E.A.), 
CEREM, Nanterre, Octobre 1986, p.4-5. 
2. Most strongly Albert Bressand in his introduction to a 
workshop on "Economie mondiale: quel r6le pour l'Europe" of the 
conference "Europespective", Paris 23-25.4; 1987. 
3. Pessimism about the Third World's ability to industrialise, 
so prevalent in the 'sixties, was based on "arms-length" 
assumptions: no access to capital·markets; technology and know-
how; final markets. All these were supplied by MNCs. 
4. See on this point A. Jaquemin et.al., "Competition 
Europeenne et Cooperation entre Entreprises en Matiere de 
Recherche-Developpement", EEC "Collection Document de Travail", 
IV/761/85-FR, 1985 
5. One system of change in this respects is the rise of a new 
research line in Anglosaxon economics called "strategic trade 
theory", which much against the preferences of its practioners 
not only proves the existence of stratgegic trade behaviour, 
but shows substantial gains for nations which "cheat" against 
the GATT/competitive norm. For a summary of the recent 
literature see "Strategic Trade Policy: Is There a Case for 
Intervention?", CEPR Bulletin; February 1987, pp 3ff. See 
also the earlier survey by A. Jacquemin: "Imperfect market 
structure and Internal Trade, some Recent Research", Kyklos, 
no. 3 5, 19 82. 
In the field of cooperation research proper, the strategic 
- 66 -
-21-
elements have been brought out very sharply by D. Turck, "La 
Tunique de Nesseus: les strategies d'accords internationaux des 
entreprises japonaises." Cahier d'Etudes no. 85-87, ESCP, 
Paris, 1985. 
6. L.A.R.E.A., 1986, op.cit.p.2. 
7. Etude realisee par Sabine Urban et Serge Vendemini, 
Universite de Strasbourg 3 pour le Commissariat General du 
Plan, La Documentation Fran9aise, Paris 1986. 
8. Urban, et. al., op.cit. p. 122- 23. The study is based on 
188 completed questionaires, supplemented by 34 in depth 
interviews. 
9. Urban, op.cit.p.29 
10. Prof. Brian Bayliss kindly let has have some the results 
of an as yet unpublished, and untitled research project 
supported by the British Economic and Social Research Council. 
11. M. Porter, M. Fuller, R. RAwlinson, Coalitions and Global 
Strategies, Harvard Business School, 1984. Cited in Jaquemin, 
Lammerant, et.al., Competition Europeenne, op;cit. p. 16. 
12. CEREM, Les Strategies d'Accord, op.cit. p. 29. 
13. Since the Prognos table reports answers to a questionaire 
by business representatives, certain phenomena (notably 
oligopolistic and other anti-competitive behavior) are unlikely 
to be mentioned explicitly. 
14. Jaquemin, Competition europeenne, op.cit., p.10. 
15. OECD, Competition Policy and Joint Venture, Paris 1986, p. 
24. 
-22-
CHAPTER II MEASURING THE COSTS OF OBSTACLES 
1. Methodology 
By any academic standard our task of estimating micro- and 
macro-economic welfare losses incurred by Euro-wide operating 
business due to regulatory diversity was impossible 
especially in a period of three months. Thus 
We did not, and do not know the proportion of 
manufacturing value-added which is generated in Europe 
within a TBA context. 
We did and do not know for certain what economic benefits 
are derived from TBA. 
We did and do not know what difference the implementation 
of the White Paper agenda, and of a more farreaching 
creation of a Euro-wide regulatory context for business 
would make. 
What we could do is to make estimates; to report estimates made 
by others on as disaggregate level as possible; and to 
aggregate these with a methodology which is as explicitly 
stated as possible. 
Given our experience with drafts circulated earlier we ask the 
reader to respect the distinction between empirical 
observation, survey-derived estimates, measurement, educated 
guesses on quantitative relationships, "hard" published data 
multiplied with all of the foregoing assumptions and estimates; 
and theory - all of which had to be combined to arrive at least 
at a more differentiated understanding of the phenomenon, and 
at best at orders of magnitude which have the character of a 
reasoned hypothesis. 
Working in an area where relevant academic theory was hard~to 
find required some bold innovation. We partially circumvented 
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the problem of estimating the welfare benefits of TBA - and 
hence the cost of obstacles - by relying on the views of 
business executives. This worked for precisely defined areas, 
notably of business administration and management, but would 
not allow us to capture the wider macro-structural significance 
of the phenomenon we were studying. For this we had to invent 
what amounts to a "positive" theory of European TBA, albeit on 
the basis of some new academic thinking and research in 
industrial economics. 
Since our task was, ultimately, to aggregate what had to be 
little better than anecdotal evidence, we had to first bring 
some structure to the universe we were studying. 
The key to our analytical approach is contained in Figure 1, 
which we re-use, with variants, throughout this report.~ 
C~ratfon 
benef" 1 ts Fron + 
TBA 
co 
Hr or ca.s•• 
1. We start from the assumption that the potential benefits 
of a contractual link between two Community firms vary 
from very high to negative. Each of the actual and 
potential cases of TBA are plotted on the y-axis, with a 
value of the benefit of TBA assigned to each case. This- is 
the downward sloping curve in the diagram. 
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2. Potential benefits are reduced by diseconomies in 
management and production which are caused by Non-Europe. 
This is the part of reality one can actually observe and 
which we tried to estimate via the business surveys. 
Multiplied by the number of TBA cases actually existing in 
the Community, these directly observable costs are 
represented by the integral A in our graph. Here we have 
attempted to quantify our estimates. 
3. Integral B contains the "might-have-beens" of European TBA 
which were discouraged by Non-Europe. We have assessed 
this "opportunity cost" in qualitative terms. There is a 
point - BM 1 - where the costs of Non-Europe become larger 
than the benefits of what would otherwise be profitable 
cases of TBA. At this point TBA does not take place. This 
creates integral B, a theoretical construct which we 
cannot directly observe although we have ample empirical 
evidence that it exists. 
4. Integral C represents that part of industry where TBA 
would not make sense even in a Europe with uniform 
regulations for business. These are firms, or activities, 
with either local markets and no need for a contractual 
supply of outside technology or components, e.g. brick 
making; or small and very specialised firms who are in 
effect global monopolists in their particular niches: 
certain machine tool and instrument makers for instance. 
That last remark makes clear that each industrial sector will 
have its own pattern. The size of A and B is not only a 
function of the structure of an industry, its markets, the way 
technology is generated, etc. and hence of the "inherent" 
advantages of TBA for that industry; but also of the incidence 
and costs of obstacles. We have tried to take account of these 
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differences in our analysis and estimates. 
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2. The Business Survey 
As stated, our main empirical task was to "measure" the costs 
of regulatory dJversity to existing TBA; and, to a lesser 
degree, to determine the point at which TBA was discouraged 
altogether. 
Under the circumstances (including the time constraint) relying 
on a direct business survey, as specified in the terms of 
reference, proved the only feasible route. The alternative 
would have been a detailed audit at each firm to bring out, 
e.g. the extra administrative costs caused by different fiscal 
systems; and an independent assessment of the economic gains 
which could be achieved by better plant location; 
specialisation; R&D simplification etc. which would become 
possible if obstacles were removed, etc. 
Our empirical work was based on a standardised interview of 
some 70 companies in four countries (D, GB, F, I) which 
(collectively) had subsidiaries (or parents) in most Member 
States. 
In addition, we interviewed experts in national and EEC 
industrial federations and others with a working experience of 
our area of enquiry. 
Interviews conducted between September 3 and November 11, 1987, 
and lasted from 1 1/2 hours to seven hours. They usually 
involved several of the following executives: 
Chief executive 
Acquisitions manager 
Finance manager 
Head of the legal department 
Export manager 
Logistics manager 
The broad technical range of our interview questions, -which 
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covered such diverse areas as fiscal administration; R&D ; 
industral policy; and social insurance required specialist 
knowledge which few single individuals could possess. This 
at least in the larger companies, to a lengthy internal 
led, 
decision making process to designate and coordinate interview 
partners. The sensitivity of some of the questions, e.g. on 
fiscal fraud or national discrimination further complicated 
access. Last but not least, most major companies had been 
contacted by at least one other team of the Cost of Non-Europe 
project. In all, therefore, a major part of the time and energy 
of our research team was spent in setting up interviews. In 
smaller companies with scarce management resources and a 
pragmatic, non-numerate approach to cost control, we had to be 
content with partial interviews and/or impressionistic 
estimates. 
In order to increase the chance of making valid comparisons 
even with very small samples (15-20 companies in each country), 
we tried to set up interviews with companies from a limited 
number of sectors: 
automobiles 
pharmaceuticals 
textiles 
machinery/machine tools 
telecommunications 
In addition we interviewed several food processors, two 
computer manufacturers, a chemical company, a major rubber 
producer, and several producers of professional and consumer 
electronics. This departure from our original sample 
restrictions - forced by the vagaries of access - proved 
extremely useful to confirm the existence of patterns which 
allowed all manufacturing sectors to be allocated to three 
groups. 
A third break-down in our sample, in addition-to-the sectoral 
and national one, was that between large companies and SMEs. 
3 -
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Here, too, we obtained robust findings of significant 
differences. 
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3. The standardised interview 
Previous to the oral interview companies had normally received 
a one page outline of the broad areas of questioning. The 
interviews started with an open-ended question of what seemed 
to be the most important obstacle to doing cross-frontier 
business in Europe. 
We then went through our standardised interview. This was 
divided into six policy areas, namely 
Industrial policy 
Company law, incl. fiscal problems 
Social· legislation 
Product/production regulations 
(Other) Trade impediments 
Technology Exchange 
In order to have as large an element of standardisation as 
possible we asked an identical set of detailed question for 
each of the six regulatory/policy areas. This so-called "Repeat 
Module" is reproduced only once in this presentation, although 
in practice it formed the bulk of the interview. 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
Governments tend to support their national industries. They do 
this by granting subsidies to general costs or to R&D; 
preferential access to procurement markets; informal suasion 
etc. 
Have you felt that this has caused difficulties in running your 
JV/subsidiary? In particular: 
Did your partner, by cooperating with you, jeopardize his 
chances to get subsidies for R&D; access to national 
procurement markets? 
Was there informal pressure on that partner, or on yourself by 
your own government., to look for a partner of the same 
nationalit~; or to limit cooperation in the interest of 
national control? 
) -
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REPEAT MODULE 
1. How has this concretely influenced your operation? 
(Room for open response to be registered where and if 
appropriate in scheme below. Then continue questioning to 
check/encourage recall). 
(space) 
2. Did it cause you to limit the intensity of TBA or 
desist from engaging in it altogether 
to 
limit forego 
- joint R&D ( ) 
- joint marketing ( ) 
- joint input procurement ( ) 
- joint {integrated) production strategy ( ) 
- exchange of personell/ ( ) 
cross-frontier use of specialists ( ) 
- centralising administrative functions ( ) 
other comments: 
3. Did it cause you additional costs ? 
(quantify as much as possible) 
a. Overheads: 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
l ) 
t ) 
Personnel: extra numbers ( ); transfer costs ( ); extra 
training ( ) 
Hardware (extra testing equipment; other duplication) 
Financing costs 
b. Running costs of production: 
Cost of raw materials, semi-finished, components 
Other production costs: efficiency of plant use etc. 
Stock management 
Extra costs of trading between the partners; to outside 
markets? 
4. Other 
Did the need to gather adequate information, in addition to 
personnel costs cause delays in production; cause you to make 
investment mistakes? 
--------------- END OF REPEAT MODULE -------------------------
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COMPANY LAW 
When setting up your foreign venture, or while running it, did 
you have particular legal difficulties? Was it hard to find a 
mutually satisfactory form of legal contract (JVs) or form of 
incorporation? 
Was it difficult to avoid problems of double taxation? 
Did your subsidiary/JV experience problems to get tax relief 
for R&D expenditures? Was competition law a problem? 
Did different auditing standards and traditions cause costs? 
REPEAT MODULE 
SOCIAL LEGISLATION 
Many social protection agreements have to negotiated at;plant 
level with local unions and local authorities. This is true 
even within your own country and thus interests us less in this 
context. But did you find (your own, or your partner's) 
national regulations on social insurance inhibiting transfer of 
personnel ("expatriation")? Ditto the need for professional 
certification of certain technical personnel? 
What about legal restrictions on lay-offs? 
Trade union role in co-determination? 
REPEAT MODULE 
PRODUCT:PRODUCTION REGULATIONS 
In planning and executing you joint operation did you find 
national regulations on product and production standards, and 
the procedures to enforce them, a handicap? E.g. 
- safety rules for machinery (including no~se, ergonomics); 
- other conformity rules, and their certification? 
- environmental standards for production; and products ? 
product liability; insurance. 
We would like you to distinguish between trade problems as such 
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which may arise from some of these regulations; and their cost 
in terms of a rational and efficient joint production planning, 
specialisation. 
REPEAT MODULE 
(OTHER) TRADE IMPEDIMENTS 
Trade between EEC Member States continues to be hampered by 
obstacles other than different norms and standards; notably VAT 
administration; "customs" administration (paper work); costly 
delays at the border, etc. 
Has this been a significant factor for you? 
REPEAT MODULE 
TECHNOLOGY EXCHANGE 
Was patent protection an issue? 
Did you find difficulties_ to exchange technology with your 
partner due to the fact that his or your technology had been 
developed within some national support programme? 
Have COCOM regulations hampered your technology cooperation, 
component exchanges, etc.? 
REPEAT MODULE 
CURRENCY/CAPITAL TRANSFER PROBLEMS 
Did you find restraints on 
- direct foreign investment (access) 
- access to the partner's capital market 
- transfering of your own capital abroad (Italy, France only) 
- currency transfers for current operations? 
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REPEAT MODULE 
Other essential information 
(note and/or ask if not yet emerged from interview:) 
1. Nature of the TBA 
Joint venture ( ) ; subsidiary 
2. Product sector 
3. Nationality of respondent company 
company 
); other ( 
partner 
4. Turnover of the company (specify unit referred to): 
4. Verbal summary of results of the business survey 
4.1. Individual obstacles 
Industrial policy 
) 
In this first item we strayed furthest from our brief to 
examine regulatory obstacles, as we are dealing here above all 
with the discretionary and discriminatory application of 
national regulation, or its de facto discriminatory effect. We 
were interested in such things as cut-off from (para-)statal 
credit lines; discrimination in R&D support and in access to 
procurement markets for "foreign" subsidiaries; pressures to 
increase local content; etc. Our findings can be summarised as 
follows: 
There was little hard evidence that governments discriminatyd 
widely against subsidiaries with foreign parents as regards 
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access to R&D funds. However, a foreign-owned subsidiary 
seeking access to national programmes sometimes needed to 
engage in an extra effort to persuade authorities of its 
positive contribution to employment and exports; and the 
discretionary nature of decision-making left an (only slightly 
discouraging) margin of uncertainty. 
However, national R&D programmes may be discontinued altogether 
if a whole sector passes into "foreign" hands (consumer 
electronics in Germany). On the other end of the scale, a 
country building up a strategic technology from scratch, i.e. 
one previously dominated by foreign technology, may practise 
outright discrimination against foreign-owned subsidiaries 
(telecom in Italy). 
Some countries with inward investment controls (e.g. Spain, but 
also Greece and even France) may make the take-over of 
attractive companies conditional on the simultaneous take-over 
of lame ducks. 
As regards procurement, local content (employment) 
considerations were more important than ownership. Exceptions 
are newly established subsidiaries (often in hi-tech areas) who 
have not yet acquired a national "smell" and established 
working relationships with the bureaucracy. (Here as elsewhere, 
local content based discrimination provides an incentive to TBA 
which, for the company, is inefficient.) 
Odd cases of "local content" maximisation could be found in the 
pharmaceutical industry, where price controls can be 
manipulated to that end. In Belgium, it was charged, 
authorities "rewarded" local production with higher price~. In 
Britain, it was suggested by non-British companies, price 
controls are related to total investment, including R&D. This 
led European companies to "overinvest" in British R&D 
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activities: with 4% of the world market, Britain accounted for 
10% of world research. 
Non-Europe's competitive national industrial policies 
encouraged otherwise non-economic local production not just in 
these cases, and in the procurement case mentioned earlier, but 
also because of export credits. Thus German firms may upgrade 
local content in France in order to benefit from more generous 
export finance. On the other hand, products from truly 
integrated operations may fall below the local content barrier 
in any country, and hence be excluded from export credits, 
causing a competitive disadvantage from being "European". 
More generally, some companies complained bitterly of the 
political risk involved in "going European" without the support 
of a "government" at that level. In one case, a company 
instituted an across-the-board cut of employment of 10% in all 
its subsidiaries to forestall charges of "job-killing". This 
economically inefficient step is the politically induced cost 
of the private sector doing on its own what the EC is trying in 
rationalising the steel sector. 
Company Law and taxation 
Non-Europe in the area of legal and fiscal regulation of 
company management was the single most important source of 
costs in engaging in TBA. These cost occurred both a the 
administrative leveli and at the production level through 
suboptimal plant and resource location. 
The root cause of problems is not so much company law itself, 
i.e. legal differences regarding the rules of setting up and 
running limited companies. These have been reduced through 
decades of EEC harmonisation efforts. Rather, it lies in 
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different fiscal systems: the level of profit taxes; and 
differences in treatment of capital write-off; retained or 
distributed dividends; allowances for R&D expenditure, etc. 
These differences in turn effect two areas of management: 
auditing on the one hand; and the (related) problem of transfer 
pricing. Legitimate attempts by companies to limit tax 
liability clash with a no less legitimate attempt by 
governments to collect their due; and the common practice (non-
Europe!) to maximise their share of the total tax take relative 
to other countries. 
Auditing 
While minimal common auditing standards exist in the EEC, three 
elements cause significant divergences: different national 
traditions and legal differences on "details'' (e.g. adjustment 
for currency changes); different purposes for presenting 
accounts, notably the relative weight of stock markets; and 
different fiscal implications of treating items like "extra-
ordinary" profits and losses etc. Occasionally the work of 
harmonising parent and subsidiary accounts is complicated by 
different reporting dates. 
The administrative problem is magnified by the fact that 
companies' internal accounting (controlling) is coloured by 
existing legal auditing systems. Most large companies therefore 
have to produce three sets of figures: those conforming to the 
national requirements of the parent company, and which include 
the consolidated (i.e. "translated") accounts of subsidiaries; 
national accounts for each subsidiary; and a standardised, 
firm-specific system used by all units for controlling 
purposes. 
While some of the cost of ''translation" can be handled by the 
appropriate software, experts are needed in both subsidiaries 
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and parent companies to fine tune the system. Fees for legal 
consultants and, of course, external auditors, are substantial. 
The Fourth Company Law Directive dealing with accounting 
standards was mentioned only by one company as having improved 
the situation. 
The foregoing remarks refer to current costs of operating TBAs. 
A substantially larger cost is incurred at the moment of 
takeover, i.e. a once only investment to adapt company systems 
to each other, and to train personnel in the new subsidiary in 
the use of the system. Moreover, the true profitability of the 
new company may only become apparent to central management 
after this process is completed. Both costs: financial and 
uncertainty, may constitute obstacles to transborder business 
expansion. 
Taxes 
The problems caused by ''fiscal suspicion" and beggar-thy-
neighbour attempts by national tax authorities to maximise 
their share of an EMs total tax liability have much graver 
consequences. They do not only cause administrative costs but 
influence locational decisions regarding group administration, 
R&D, and production. 
Companies are suspected to use transfer prices to maximise tax 
liability in the most favorable country. There is no doubt that 
this suspicion is sometimes justified, although even then there 
is a cost (of manipulation) to the firm; and a dead-weight loss 
to the economy. 
Responses, notably regarding the desirability of a unified 
European company law, differed according to whether one talked 
to the tax specialists (notably external consultants) who 
rather enjoyed the game of "arbritrage"; and executives, 
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notably of large companies, who recognised the cost to company 
management and planning imposed by fiscal suspicion. Moreover, 
a large part of the energies of tax lawyers were simply devoted 
to avoiding double taxation. 
Thus, one French EM had to institute a complex system of cost-
accounting at the production level to satisfy German 
authorities of the bona-fides of the prices charged to its 
German subsidiary. Dito a large German electronics company to 
satisfy Italian authorities. In addition, companies complained 
about the periodic and prolonged (up to 8 months) presence of 
controllers on the premises of especially German subsidiaries. 
Another company pointed out that national requirements on 
transfer prices were inconsistent (e.g. as regards short-term 
variations of exchange rates), so that the company had to be in 
an illegal situation somewhere. In fact, "Europe would grind to 
a halt if national legislation were fully applied". Living with 
such ambiguities, however, is both costly and highly unnerving 
to executives. 
The problem of transfer prices sometimes intersected with that 
of different product standards, since "home" and "export" 
prices for the same product could differ because of different 
specifications - an argument difficult to explain to tax 
authorities. 
Many companies complained of the difficulty of charging its 
subsidiaries for central R&D expenditure. This is particularly 
awkward in view of the fact that, from an economic point of 
view technology transfer and R&D scale economies are among the 
most useful features of TBA. 
Particular scrutiny (including at customs) is reserved for the 
transfer price of software. It was much easier, our respondents 
claimed, for an independent firm to "export'' software at its 
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just value than for an integrated TBA. Software makes up 
significant proportions of the value of an increasing number of 
products (machine-tools +-30%; telematics (50% +); it is also 
the form in which production know-how is often transferred. If 
the full value of this "component" cannot be charged by the 
main technology holder in an integrated company or a joint 
venture, serious distortions result. For example, a firm may 
choose to sell "embodied" software, i.e. a hard product, rather 
than utilising local production opportunities. 
Yet a third consequence of suspicion towards "immaterial" 
transfers was the difficulty for central management companies 
to level a management charge on their subsidiaries. This again 
inhibits economies of scale in administration; and the 
development of Euro-centric rather than national loci of 
planning and know-how. However, abuses are not uncommon. 
As regards Italy, many of these problems were accentuated by a 
second motive for suspicion, i.e. the circumvention of capital 
controls. This not only influenced current TBAs, but also 
busines1: expansion (i.e. acquisitions; for more detail see the 
notes on individual countries, below). 
In all, the extra administrative costs imposed by different 
auditing and fiscal systems was estimated at 10-30% of the 
relevant administrative departments. This, to us, surprisingly 
high figure was cited by all large European companies. A 
partial exception were British companies which did not, by and 
large, engage in truly integrated operations. (See also section 
3, below). 
Many companies cited the impossibility of reducing tax 
liability by off-setting profits in one branch by losses in 
another as very costly to their operations, and a clear dis-
incentive to diversify production outside national borders. 
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One particularly serious obstacle to business expansion is the 
practice of tax authorities to levy capital gains taxes on 
firms taken over or merged, i.e. treating this as a case of 
"realised assets". The holding company, with both partners 
remaining legally in existence, is a clumsy substitute for a 
true merger (inter alia necessitating three tax and auditing 
systems). An exception are the Netherlands, where (foreign) 
companies can obtain a "ruling" before a merger. Even then 
compnaies still face the problem of negotiating their exit from 
the previous tax residences. 
A last item under the heading of company law and fiscal 
suspicion relates to the rigidity of many national company 
statutes. The growing preference of European multinationals to 
choose the Netherlands as headquarters had less to do with tax 
advantages (dividends), and more with the flexibility and 
pragmatism of Dutch laws, not least as regards the ability of 
holding companies to levy and transfer immaterial income, e.g. 
from royalties, trade marks, etc. Some firms have transferred 
from tax-friendly Luxemburg for this reason. Flexibility also 
extends to such things as voting rights - important in joint 
ventures - where tailor-made agreements between partners are 
accepted, provided they are spelled out in writing. 
Product/production standards 
While this problematique is the object of specialised studies 
in the Cost of Non-Europe project, our interest related 
particularly to its effect on integrated business planning in 
Europe. 
We found that some large firms devoted 1/3 of their R&D (with 
the stress on "D") budgets to the adjustment of their 
technology to different national settings. This obviously 
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reduces the scale advantages from R&D which would otherwise 
accrue to integrated European companies. 
Alternatively, the innovative output of a given R&D effort 
would be greater. This problem applies particularly to 
telecommunication on the one hand and mass-produced electronic 
components, automobile components and standardised machine 
tools. It has less relevance in industrial plant and machinery 
made to customer specifications. 
As regards product standards, even the most marginal 
divergences (e.g. labelling requirements) prevented, at the 
very least, efficient, i.e. centralised and flexible, stock 
management. Stock management/ including the option of having a 
central European warehouse in a post-"1992" world, was 
particularly important to relatively small European 
multinationals with specialised products (e.g. hospital 
supplies). 
As regards regulations of production, the piecemeal 
introduction of pollution standards in Europe caused major 
uncertainties in investment planning and/or led to distorted 
locational decisions. 
It is worth noting that all problems under this heading caused 
costs to EMs and rather discouraged them to increase the level 
of integration (i.e. some of their activities remained in our 
integral B; while some of the same problems encouraged SMEs to 
seek local production partners to adapt their product to local 
standards; get type approval, etc., i.e. to engage in TBA in 
the first place. 
Trade Obstacles 
Again we limit our remarks to their impact on integrated 
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business strategies. 
Border delays and uncertainties are becoming increasingly 
relevant as just-in-time management of components is gaining in 
importance. TBA by EMs, with their tight logistics planning, is 
hampered by this even more than arms-length trade. While 
customs are one source of the problem, divergent social and 
technical regulation of the transportation industry was cited 
as an additional risk factor. 
Intra-EEC applications of COCOM controls were mentioned by many 
firms in the electronics and advanced engineering sectors. The 
problems were hold-ups at the borderi difficulties in carrying 
out speedy repairs (spare-parts)i and differences in national 
COCOM lists. 
Together with the familiar deadweight administrative and 
resource cost of border-crossing (1% of value according to our 
respondents) uncertainty penalises otherwise efficiency-
enhancing forms of integrated TBA which would allow large scale 
economies through decentralised components manufacture. 
A particular problem is posed by Italy, which prohibits 
temporary imports of components for re-export in a chain of 
value-added, necessitating the administrative (fiscal, customs) 
registration of two sales. Ditto for demonstration machines, 
test equipment and other temporary exports. 
Non-Europe was also said to hamper business planning due to the 
discretionary and varied national administration of the common 
external policy by different countries (quota enforcement). 
Social Policy 
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TBA, especially within integrated businesses, requires the 
exchange of some managerial and technical personnel. This 
raises the question of the "portability" of social security 
benefits, notably pension schemes, which are tailored to 
national fiscal systems and/or related to public schemes. In 
practice, the firm must pay twice, raising salary costs by 10 -
15%. Lack of "mutual recognition" of secondary and other school 
diplomas by dependents also reduced flexbility of technical and 
managerial staff. 
A different problem is posed by differences in technical 
training in Europe. Man/machine interfaces and production in 
general are designed with particular skill combinations in 
mind. Some firms spend considerable sums to train the 
workforces in their subsidiaries to conform to a particular 
standard, and to make communication at the various technical 
levels possible. 
Capital and Current Transfers 
Here there were few general problems: most were country 
specific. One general problem, however, was the difficulty of 
gaining access to local stock-exchanges to finance a new 
subsidiary for medium-sized companies. 
Italy, among the major countries, continues to be a special 
case. We deal with it under point 3 below. The main point to 
make is that only large and very"sophisticated companies can 
engage in genuine TBA. 
Currency risks were cited by virtually all French EMs, some of 
which are considering introducing the ECU as internal 
accounting unit. Complaints about currency risks were also 
occasionally made by companies in other countries. The extra 
problem raised for transfer prices has been mentioned. One 
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German hi-tech EM called for the speedy introduction of the ECU 
as an official means of payment. 
5. Large and small companies 
While there were important exceptions, TBA by European 
multinationals (EMs) on the one hand, and small and medium-
sized enterprises on the other, could be clearly distinguished 
as follows: 
Large companies always engage in some form of TBA. SMEs rarely 
do so. 
Large companies are almost always growth oriented, with a 
tendency for expansion to spill over to Europe; smaller 
companies tend to seek value-added rather than volume growth. 
SMEs are above all interested in marketing, with local 
production often an unplanned afterthought when it occurs, e.g. 
via a gradual expansion of after-sales service; adaption of 
products to local standards; or co-production with a former 
sales "agent". 
Large companies are more likely to systematically exploit cost 
advantages, notably labour and transport, and scale advantages; 
they are also driven by formal or informal local content 
considerations; more rarely by political diversification of 
supply risks (strikes). They also systematically exploit 
investment and export incentives. 
SMEs tend to have a relatively arms-length relationship even 
with wholly-owned production subsidiaries abroad, using long-
term contracts not very different from those concluded with 
third parties. This reflects their relative scarcity of 
management resources and, in particular, international 
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expertise. 
Most European multinationals prefer a hands-on approach to 
management, not only in order to exploit all manner of 
technical and economic cost advantages (of which SMEs may be 
only vaguely aware); but also in order to pursue market 
strategies which are directed not only at the customers (as in 
the case of SMEs) but at competitors. Sophisticated financial 
management, including tax minimisation; use of capital markets; 
currency portfolio management, etc. is scarcely practised by 
firms with less than 2000 employees. 
This makes sense in terms of relative management cost; but 
suggests untapped opportunities for external service providers, 
e.g. banks, with the requisite economies of scale. 
6. Country variations 
With the exception of Italy, variations in responses seemed to 
owe less to objective differences in regulations than to 
differences in "industrial culture" and general attitudes 
towards "Europe". At any rate, they confirmed stereo-types. 
United Kingdom 
The most striking peculiarity of UK companies is the preference 
for arms-length management of TBAs. Even world-sized companies 
(unless owned by Americans) seemed to look at their European 
subsidiaries more in terms of investment diversification than 
in exploiting the opportunities of continental integration in 
production, research, and marketing. Thus, for example, the 
expatriation of staff was not an issue in any of our twenty 
British interviews. R&D was pursued in parallel (duplicated) by 
closely related subsidiaries. "The first time we saw our 
colleagues was in the BRITE programme", according to the 
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Italian executive of a hi-tech British-owned engineering 
subsidiary. Subsidiaries were often managed by special holdings 
with a handful of staff, headquartered in London - far from the 
manufacturing headquarters located in the provinces, again 
confirming the financial over the industrial interest. 
Given the low level of integration, Non-Europe was not 
perceived as a great problem for British companies engaging in 
TBA. 
France 
In France, hands-on management was typical even for medium-
sized enterprises. "Expatriation" of management staff was 
common. There was great pride in being ''European". In contrast 
to the other three countries, being merely French was 
considered provincial. Like Italy, companies in mature sectors 
threatened by both German and extra-European competition saw 
the European "home market" as the only chance for survival 
through economies of scale in production, marketing, and R&D. 
High levels of production integration made French companies 
more sharply aware of the problems of non-Europe than those of 
other countries. 
Germany 
Although they are in fact active practioners, German firms are 
often reluctant players in the game of TBA. Direct exports are 
generally preferred over local production, except when it comes 
to exploiting labour-cost advantages in Britain, Spain, and 
Portugal. But formal and informal local content pressures 
provide an incentive to produce abroad, as may the relative 
strict limits on national expansion imposed by the Kartellamt. 
But, paradoxically, the strong industrial export orientation of 
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German industry, with its consequent large and sophisticated 
presence on neighbouring markets, also means that German 
(medium-sized) firms are often more likely than those of other 
countries to discover the limits of direct exports and to 
complement these with TBA. For some large firms, like chemicals 
and electronics, "multinational know-how" acquired through a 
global presence has lately been transferred more whole-
heartedly to the Community Market. 
Italy 
Italian TBA fully confirms to the overall image of Italian 
industry, i.e. a private sector struggling to thrive in spite 
of the State. 
As in France, large companies in the more traditional sectors 
see the extension to "Europe" as the only chance of remaining 
competitive. In other words, moves to rationalise European 
industry will not be spearheaded by the strongest country, 
Germany, but by relatively weaker competitors. 
The major problem for Italian companies were capital controls 
which effectively prevent smaller firms from engaging in TBA. 
Getting permission to invest in a productive facility abroad is 
not a problem- it just takes time (3 months). Permission for 
an increase in capital already involves more difficult 
negotiations. Most difficult of all is to get permission to 
create a holding abroad. 
Only very large companies can assume the cost of "negotiating" 
such a permit with the relevant ministriesi and, subsequently 
to prepare lengthy annual reports to those ministries. For 
these go well beyond normal audit requirements. 
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The combination of capital controls with controls on tax 
evasion, and hence the need to negotiate acceptable business 
plans with both the Finance and the Foreign Trade Ministries, 
was felt to complicate life, even for large companies. 
The extra-territorial application of Italian controls is 
another interesting feature: further investments by Italian 
subsidiaries (i.e. legally French etc. companies), need 
approval from Rome. 
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~C~H~A~P~T~E~R~I~I~I~~O~b~s~t~a~c~l~e~s-=a~n~~ the White Paper agenda 
As stated earlier, we were encouraged to define the Non-Europe 
of business regulation more broadly than the White Paper 
section dealing with "business cooperation". Indeed, this 
corresponded to business views. On the other hand, the often 
sceptical reactions of business to Commission proposals in the 
narrow area of business cooperation (see point 2 below) is more 
than counterbalanced by the relevance of the agenda as a whole 
for promoting TBA. 
In the following we sometimes go over the same ground covered 
in our business survey; but this time we look at the relevance 
of the remedies prapcsed by the White paper, rather than the 
cost of obstacles to TBA as such. 
1. Non-company law iqlRtives 
Trade 
An important part of reforming the environment for doing 
business in Europe is, of course, trade. TBA, as we saw, is to 
some extent a substitute for trade and, more particularly, a 
way around trade barriers. Hence some of the latter motivation 
would disappear with the full implementation of the White Paper 
agenda on trade liberalisation. But other reasons for TBA would 
remain and even be re-inforced. As we saw in the chapter on 
''networking", the efficient organisation of exchanges tends to 
involve a mix between arms-length and contractual 
relationships, and both of these involve moving goods across 
borders. 
One particular item on the trade agenda is standards. Again, as 
we saw, TBA may be positively encouraged rather than hindered, 
by differences in national standards, certification procedures, 
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etc. But the type of business cooperation which really changes 
the efficiency of the European economy, i.e. which relialises a 
sophisticated division of labour through networks and/or 
integrated management of production, is obviously much easier 
if the. various pieces can fit together and are acceptable on 
the whole market. 
Services 
Another item is the liberalisation of services. Most businesses 
have established relations with a house bank, their own 
insurance company, and even law and public relations firms. 
Building up such relationships in a foreign country is costly. 
Again, horizontal TBA is sometimes a second best response to 
this problem, i.e. a firm acquires a partner who, with his 
established relationships, takes care of the problem of 
financial and other services. On the other hand, and especially 
for TBA involving substantial capital participation and hence 
control, having access to familiar service providers is clearly 
seen as an asset by business. The way American banks, 
advertising agencies etc. followed the expansion of US direct 
(productive) investment in Europe in the 'sixties illustrates 
this point. 
An indirect effect of creating conditions for cross-border 
trade in services is national de-regulation: there can be no 
Community market until there are genuine national markets. De-
regulation has the effect of improving services to 
manufacturing industry, notably by increased flexi bility and 
lower costs. The degree to which the Internal Market is seen as 
a "natural" space for business expansion will greatly depend on 
the liberalisation of services. 
Apart from financial services, transport services are of 
particular interest for TBA. The fact that it may be cheaper to 
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fly from London to New York than to Athens is only one aspect. 
Another is protectionist regulation of trucking. In many 
countries the only way firms have of avoiding the outrageous 
rates and limits on cabotage imposed by regulation is through 
company-owned trucking fleets. But these often may not be used 
freely even among wholly owned, but legally independent, 
subsidiaries; much less with "foreign" cooperation partners. 
Although this problem arises both within and among Member 
States, the greater distances associated with trans- border 
cooperation, and the prevalence of looser forms of cooperation, 
multiply the negative effects in Europe. 
One particular service requires special mention: 
telecommunications. As the Commission's recently approved Green 
Paper shows, creating an integrated European market for 
telecoms services is a complex affair, requiring national 
liberalisation; cross-border liberalisation and non-
discriminatory rate setting; technical harmonisation; and the 
creation of a jointly developed, high-capacity infrastructure. 
The importance for business cooperation in Europe is crucial: 
the creation of a network for networks. 
Capital markets 
Although not unrelated to services liberalisation, capital 
market liberalisation is, rightly, dealt with separately in the 
White Paper. Different rules and regulations governing 
securities markets do present a real obstacle to business 
cooperation, notably when it involves the acquisition of 
shares. 
Among the remedies proposed in the White Paper are: 
an extension (agreed by Council in November 1986) of 
earlier EEC directives on liberalisation of capital 
movements (early 1960s) to include the acquisition and 
sale of unlisted securities; and the issuing and placing 
ot the securities of non-resident companies; 
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a proposal to coordinate EEC rules on the contents of 
prospectuses to be published when listing securities; 
a proposal (made April 1987) for the abolition of stamp 
duty on transactions in securitiesi 
initiatives to coordinate disciplines regarding trade in 
securities 
a proposed directive (COM (87) 111) aligning laws for 
combatting insider trading; 
a draft proposal (now at stage of a consultative document) 
for a directive requiring minimum guarantees on 
information to be given to those involved in take-over 
operationsi and 
a proposed Directive (October 1987) abolishing dual 
exchange markets which discriminate against capital 
transfers. 
Competitlnn policy 
Competition policy, both in the sense of anti-trust and in the 
form of control of state aids (subsidies), does of course play 
a major role in setting the conditions for TBA. Since this is a 
complex subject in itself, we limit ourselves to a few remarks 
resulting directly from our interviews. 
The first obstacle mentioned by respondents is the existence of 
double jeopardy, i.e. the co-existence of (especially the 
German) national with EEC controls. The fact that EEC controls 
are applied ex-post (in the absence of a German-style prior 
notification procedure) does provide a particularly awkward 
disincentive. Proposals to change this state of affairs have 
therefore been welcomed by business. 
In the field of cooperation in the narrow sense, notably where 
it serves technology promotion, the Commission has sought to 
reduce uncertainty by "block-exceptions" for R&D cooperation 
and joint ventures. The latest candidate are inter-company 
licensing agreements which may enter into force in 1988. 
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So far block exceptions are restricted to small and medium 
sized companies. But, according to some of our academic and 
business repondents, these companies are frequently not even 
aware that Community law might have created a problem 7, i.e. 
were not deterred from exploring cooperative opportunities even 
without block exceptions. 
As regards state subsidies, it is clear that tougher EEC 
controls of these subsidies would remove one important obstacle 
to rationalisation of whole industrial sectors, and hence 
create strong incentives for trans-European business links. 
2. Agenda items related directly to "business cooperation 11 
Discussing the contribution of the White Paper initiatives in 
favour of business cooperation faces two preliminary 
difficulties. The first is that the proposed Directives pursue 
multiple goals, such as transparency, for complex reasons of 
industrial and even social policy which go beyond 
"cooperation". Secondly, many proposals do either not exist at 
all, or will be presented in substantially modified form. In 
this sitution an assessment already burdened with an excessive 
amount of "hypotheticals" becomes even more difficult. 
Part II, Chapter VI of the White Paper on "Creation of Suitable 
Conditions for Industrial Cooperation" has three parts: 
- company law 
- intellectual property 
- taxation. 
Intellectual property has been excluded from our terms of 
reference. We reproduce below the timetable for initiatives 
under the other two chapters. 
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WHITE PAPER AGENDA ON COMPA.L'fY LAW AND TAXATION 
Doc. no. proposed adoption? 
COU.IPA.J.'-t "Y LAW 
Proposa!s for a Regulation for an 
European Economic Interest 
Grouping Com (73) 2046 1973 
Com(78) 139 1978 1985 
Proposal for a Fifth Company Law 
Directive (structure of public 
limited companies) Com (72) 887 1973 
Com(83) 185 1983 1988 
Proposal for a Tenth Directive 
concerning cross-border mergers Com (84)7Z7 1985 1987 
Proposal for an Eleventh Company 
Law Directive to dispen.s'e branches 
of companies from publishing 
sepuate accounts 1986 1988 
Proposal for a Directive on the 
liquidatioil of companies 1987 1989 
Proposals for a Directive on take 
overbids 1987 1989 
Proposal for a Dsirective on the 
relationship of undertakings in a 
group 1988 1990 
Amendment to proposal for a 1970 
Regulation on the Statute for a 
European Company Com(70)600 
Com(75) 150 1975 
1988 1990 
TAXATION (Removing tax obsta~es to cooperation betwe:::~ e:~terprises in different Member States) 
Arbitration procedure concerning 
the elimination of double taxation Com (76) 611 
Common system of taxation 
.applicable to parent compames and 
their subsidiaries Com (69) 6 
Common system of ta'l:ation of 
mergers, division and contribution 
of assets Com (69) 5 
Harmonization of taxes on 
transactions in securities Com(76) 124 
1976 1985 
1969 1985 
1969 1985 
1976 1986 
-55-
2.1 COMPANY LAW 
Since the early 1960s the EEC has pursued a policy of 
encouraging TBA by reducing diversity and increasing 
transparency. Both approaches ease access and reduce the risks 
of "foreign" market operators. While the first company law 
directives have long since become part of national legislation, 
more recent proposals - notably the 5th Directive on Boards, 
including worker participation, have created a climate of 
considerable business resistance to further harmonisation. 
More generally, company law harmonisation based on Article 54, 
3g of the Treaty aims to provide equivalent economic and legal 
protection throughout the EEC (to shareholders, creditors and 
workers) as a counterweight to the freedom for firms to 
establish anywhere in the EEC. This explains the sceptical 
attitude of some business circles to Commission proposals. 
At the same time, since the end of the transitional period 
Article 58 of the Treaty has guaranteed directly the right of 
establishment for companies on a non-discriminatory basis. So 
there is no absolute legal bar against companies seeking to set 
up cross- frontier subsidiaries which would need to be removed 
by harmonisation. Hence political and economic fears of reduced 
management flexibility and control tend to balance positive 
expectations of reduced administrative costs through further 
company law harmonisation. 
Obstacle 1: Differences in laws on company structure, powers 
and administration 
By and large, these differences are seen only as an irritant by 
large companies, particularly when contrasted to the major 
problems these companies fear they would face as a result of 
EEC attempts to remove such differences through harmonisation. 
Indeed, for many Euro-wide operating companies the negative 
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reaction to any 'foreign' meddling with national company law 
appears by far to outweigh the enthusiasm raised by the 
prospect of a levelling of legal divergencies with other EEC 
countries. 
Yet, the Commission has argued strongly - and our survey among 
integrated European companies confirms - that cross-frontier 
establishment for a company in a non-harmonised environment is 
"complex, costly and inefficient". 8 While some basic alignment 
- e.g. of capital requirements (the second company law 
directive) and of financial reporting (the fourth and seventh) 
- has now been achieved, the detail of accounting practices 
etc. remains different enough to cause costs. 
Remedies 
In the area of harmonisation of company structure, the 
principal instrument set out in the White Paper is the amended 
fifth directive (COM (83) 185), which seeks harmonised board 
structures and an 'equivalent' measure of worker participation 
in company structures throughout the EEC. Given business 
resistance, this proposal is likely to be amended. 
The draft eleventh directive, proposed in July 1986, seeks to 
simplify disclosure obligations by harmonising the reporting 
requirements imposed on branches of foreign companies. A point 
worth noting here is that the fifth and eleventh directives 
harmonise in quite different ways - the fifth by extending 
similar obligations to all 12 Member States; and the eleventh 
by removing these obligations where they exist. 
Obstacle 2: National vs. group management 
National lav75 in all Member States contain provisions which de 
facto prohibit susidiaries to be managed in ways which optimise 
13 -
-57-
the performance of the company as a whole. These provisions 
essentially serve to protect the rights of minority 
shareholders. Only German law allows the conclusion of a so-
called "Beherrschungsvertrag" which, ineffect, guarantees the 
income of minority shareholders in return for a free hand by 
management. In practice, political and legal obstacles to 
damaging employee interests - outside company law - are a more 
serious obstacle to management in the Group interest. 
Remedy 
In the area of group law, the Commission has circulated a draft 
proposal for a ninth company law directive which seeks to 
enable a group to act on a group basis while harmonising the 
safeguards required for the individual company which is a 
member of the group. 
Obstacle 3: 
Remedy 
Absence of legal framework/vehicles for 
promoting cross-frontier cooperation. 
The adoption in 1985 of the European Economic Interest 
Grouping (EEIG), which comes into force in 1989, is the 
first example of a company legal entity under Community 
law: it provides a common vehicle for numerous forms of 
joint activity between companies who fully retain their 
legal independence. 
The proposed tenth company law directive (COM (84) 727), 
which would enable full asset mergers between firms from 
different Member States (involving the disappearance of 
one of the firms), and also simplify procedures for 
restructuring a group. 
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The European company statute (COM (75) 150), would provide 
a single legal structure which companies could adopt for 
the conduct of business throughout the Community. 
Residual obstacles 
None of the proposals deal specifically with the problem of 
speeding up company registration, e.g. in the incorporation of 
new collaborative ventures like ESS, and removing 
administrative delays. However, on issues such as these, what 
is the proper role of the EEC and the national legislator? 
2.2 TAX OBSTACLES 
Fiscal experts at most of the companies we interviewed 
expressed scepticism bordering on outright rejection towards a 
genuine European company statute incorporating fiscal 
provisions. Their reasoning can be explained as follows. Assume 
that the total fiscal burden on companies in each of the Member 
States is equal. However, the structure of taxation differs 
widely among countries (i.e. the extent to which tax liability 
is reduced for R&D, other investments, dividends, jobs created, 
etc.) In addition, of course, there is reverse taxation: 
national subsidies for everything from exports to capital and 
infrastructure. 
By a combination of clever location, the use of holdings, and 
of transfer prices, companies can minimise their tax liability 
and maximise their take of subsidies to the point where they 
are better off than any purely national company. This may 
compensate for the cost of operating in a fragmented Europe. 
This means that, to be attractive, any EEC fiscal regime would 
have to set significantly lower tax rates overall to compete 
with the effective rates achieved by exploiting national 
I . 
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diversity. 
Given the difficulties of introducing a single EEC profit tax 
regime - which alone would relieve many of the problems cited 
in our business survey, the Commission nevertheless has 
developed a whole range of proposals which would effectively 
deal with TEA-inhibiting iniquities. 
Obstacle 4: Capital gains tax levied on mergers and take-
over operations 
in the case of an asset merger (i.e. where the absorbed 
company's assets are taken over by a company in another 
country), capital gains (levied by the authorities in the 
absorbed company's country) hit the difference between the 
book value of the absorbed assets and their current value, 
even though this value is not realised (turned into cash); 
in the case of share-exchange operation between companies, 
capital gains tax liability arises from the difference 
between the value of the shares carried in the books and 
that at which the transaction is carried out; 
in the case of purchase of a permanent establishment (e.g. 
factory) belonging to a company in country B by a company 
in country A via the latter's issuing shares to the 
former, the company in country B faces capital gains on 
the difference between the current value and book value of 
the permanent establishment which has been acquired from 
it via the share transaction even though it does not 
realise the monetary value of the shares. 
Remedy 
The proposed directive on "a common system of taxation of 
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mergers, divisions and contributions of assets" (COM (69) 5) 
would : 
as regards full-blown asset mergers, defer capital gains 
assessment and tax until the moment when the absorbed 
assets or contributions are actually realised. However, 
the directive would not in itself make such mergers 
possible - for that, the tenth directive on company law 
harmonisation would have to be adopted; 
as regards share exchange operations resulting in the 
acquisition of a 'qualifying majority' (= majority of 
voting stock), not levy capital gains on the transaction 
unless the shares were realised; if the directive is 
adopted and implemented, such operations - which 
constitute a widespread method of cross-frontier 
cooperation - would immediately benefit (i.e. this benefit 
does not have to await the adoption of the tenth company 
law proposal); 
as regards exchange of shares against a permanent 
establishment, defer capital gains on increased asset 
value until realisation. Adoption of the directive would 
also have immediate benefits in this case. 
Obstacle 5: Double taxation 
Liability, in the tax territory of a foreign subsidiary, of 
withholding tax on dividends distributed by the subsidiary back 
to the parent. 
j 
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Remedy 
The proposed directive on "a common system of taxation 
applicable to parent companies and their subsidiaries" (COM 
(69) 6) seeks to solve this by abolishing withholding tax on 
dividends distributed to a parent by a foreign subsidiary. An 
exception is envisaged for Germany, allowing it a residual 
level of withholding tax to compensate for the relatively low 
level of tax it currently levies on distributed profits (36%). 
In the absence of this directive, cross-frontier situations 
within the EEC are handled by bilateral double taxation 
conventions. The OECD's 1977 Model Convention on double 
taxation recommends that withholding tax should not exceed 
but this level is exceeded in many instances. 
Obstacle 6: Double taxation (transfer pricing) 
5 ~ o I 
In our business survey we discussed the pervasive impact of 
"fiscal suspicion" on the cost and freedom of managment. 
Current EEC proposals deal with a more limited problem: Tax 
authorities can carry out ex-post assessments of inter- company 
prices (i.e. legitimate, not fraudulent, transfer pricing). 
This can result in double taxation. 
An example of this is where a company in country A transfers to 
its sales office in country B, at a price of 100, goods which 
the sales office then markets at 120 in country B. Country B's 
tax authorities use the 120 figure for calculating profits tax. 
But country A's tax authorities may also audit company A and 
reassess the national market price of the products (in country 
A) at, say, 110. So tax is levied twice on the same goods. 
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Remedy 
The arbitration procedure (COM (76) 611) concerning the 
elirninaton of double taxation seeks to give the force of EEC 
law to the toothless OECD Model Convention provisions on 
arbitration of double tax disputes. The OECD arrangement 
exhorts the tax authorities concerned by a firm's complaint 
against double taxation to come together in view of a 
settlement, but this can take years and even then the issue may 
not be resolved. 
The EEC arbitration procedure says that if, after two years, 
the two tax authorities do not agree, then the problem should 
be put to the committee provided for in the directive which 
would then issue a recommendation. One or other of the two tax 
authorities could still block the recommended solution for 6 
months but, after that, in the absence of an agreement, the 
Committee's recommendation would be applied. 
Obstacle 7: Tax assessment 
It is at present impossible to offset losses made by foreign 
permanent establishments against profits made by a horne country 
company. 
Remedy 
None as yet, but at the pre-conceptual stage. 
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(blank page - following amendment) 

111 -
I 
-64-
CHAPTER IV Quantification 
1. Finding a unit of measurement 
The following table serves to illustrate the methodology we 
used to get quantitative orders of magnitudes of the costs of 
individual obstacles to TBA expressed in a comparable unit, 
i.e. per cent of total turnover. Essentially, it consisted in 
relating an interview estimate, whether expressed in money 
terms, a fraction, or a percentage of that part of the 
company's activity which was familiar to the interview 
respondent to published data in the company's annual statement 
and/or assumptions about the expenditure pattern of companies 
of this type. 
ONE FIRM'S COSf 
(case study of Europe;:;n multinationary 
Obstacle inteniew data published data assumptions o/o of 
turnover 
Fiscal 30 %due toNE fisc admin = 15% of all admin; 
administration hence NE = 5% of all admin.. 
white collar = 50% of salary 
costs; all salary = 25% of turnover 
25 :2x5% 0.63 
Training 5 million ECU turnover= 1!3 for diversity (NE) O.Q7 
for systemic inte- 6.4 bio ECU 
gration -
R&D 25% of tot::! for Total R&D= 
l'i"E 6..5% of turnover 1.6 
Umealisable Total costs = 
Location optim.i.s_-5% savings 50% of turnover 2.5 
ation possible 
Transport 10 - 15% of tot:U transport ~osts = 1 - 2% of turn- 0.2 
costs due to l'fE over 
Sum 5.0 
Special case 
Unused econ- loss of 15-20% CurrentS=-
omies of scale of current S mar- ket = 15% of 2.5 
kel turnover 
Sum 7.5 
- 112 -
-65-
The figures, which incidentally refer to an advanced auto 
components manufacturer, are surprisingly high; but yet higher 
figures could be found in state-dominated sectors (see below). 
The high figures reflect 
the very high "service" content of contemporary industrial 
production, i.e. administration, technology exchange, 
marketing, etc.; it is here that more narrow technical 
analysis of trade barriers as such are likely to yield 
much lower figures and 
the considerable - and only partially realised -
economies-of-scale opportunities which lead many companies 
to engage in TBA in the first place. Note that we are 
talking here of that 1/Sth of manufactur~ng industEy which 
I 
is actually involved in TBA (integral A), not an industry 
average. 
Of course, precise quantitative estimates were the exception, 
as most executives found it difficult to quantify e.g. 
hypothetical economy-of-scale gains. When they· did quantify, 
however, the answers were surprisingly consistent. 
With these elements in hand we needed to make a series of -
increasingly heroic - estimates to scale up our results to 
sectors, groups of sectors, manufacturing industry as a whole 
and GNP. 
The first step was to estimate an average level of cost for 
each obstacle and each industry for each country separately. 
This was done in a meeting of the four interview teams on the 
basis of the r~w interview dat·a and the summary interview 
reports which we do not reproduce here. 
' 
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This iterative round-table assessment provided a minimum of 
"calibration" of the various estimates. It also allowed a 
combination of the fragmentary quantitative data with more 
impressionist assessments of respondents to some sort of common 
unit. We limited ourselves to only four cost levels, with "1" 
corresponding roughly to a cost of less than 1% of turnover, 
experienced as a significant but not prohibitive nuisance by 
respondents, and "4" equalling a cost of 3% and above of 
turnover, i.e. the level at which respondents became angry with 
Non-Europe. 
A second step involved aggregating the country results to 
single "Euro" mangnitudes, taking into account the 
peculiarities of our not always representative samples. This 
again was done in an iterative round-table discussion among the 
principal interviewers (Table x). 
These figures aggregate not just apples and pears but apples 
and cheese. Thus the cost of "company law" sums up both the 
administrative cost, and induced scale-diseconomies. Both 
averages would be higher if there had been more truly 
integrated companies in our sample. Taking the example of 
trade-barriers, the figures may refer to actual transport 
costs; or to difficulties of border problems for just-in-time 
production-integration; or to COCOM- induced problems for 
supplying and servicing advanced machine tools - problems which 
do not arise for more conventional producers. 
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Table 2 
pharma telec auto textiles machinery 
industrial policy 4 3-4 3 0-1 1 
company law {1) 2-3 2 3 0-2 2 
"social"regul.{2) 2 1-2 2 0-3 0 
techn. standards 4 4 2-3 1 1-3 
other trade barr. 2 3 2 1 1-3 
technology trade 2 1-2 0 0 0 
int. payments * * * 
(1) _includes administrative costs and sub-optimal production 
{2) includes lay-off regulations, education, and "expatriation" 
* taken in isolation, payments restrictions ranked high only in Italy 
Leaving these caveats aside, we felt that our sectors fell into 
three broad groups: 
I Pharmaceuticals and telecommunications 
These were highly regulated and protected industries with 
a high incidence of obstacles of alrnosi all kinds, 
especially "industrial policy" an-d "technical standards". 
We estimated the total cost of Non-Europe to firms in 
this group engaging in TBA at 9% of turnover. 
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II Automobiles 
This group, together with firms in consumer electronics, a 
large rubber manufacturer and food processors, were 
hampered by industrial protection; difficulties to adjust 
the labour force in response to market shifts; economy-of-
scale losses due to quite marginal differences in 
technical standards; and substantial "administrative" 
costs if they were highly integrated. Total cost of TBA 
was estimated at 6% of turnover, i.e. higher than both 
average profits, or average R&D expenditure of firms in 
these sectors. 
III Textiles and machine tools 
This group had in common: high specialisation; a 
relatively low integration at the component level; 
subsidiaries which either served marketing and service 
purposes; or produced fairly independently parts of the 
product range; few problems with technical standards. 
Total cost of TBA = 1.7% of turnover. 
2. Estimating costs by sector 
Our next step was to estimate the points on the X-axis of our 
graph, i.e. the proportion of turnover in each group which was 
generated in a TBA context forming the base-line for integral 
A; the proportion potentially suited to TBA but discouraged by 
Non-Europe (base-line of B); and the proportion which would 
remain "local".under any circumstances (C). This latter 
category included local component suppliers as well as local 
repair and other services. 
Our methdology here was to make a detailed analysis of 
structural elements of each sector which tend to "allocate" 
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portions of the total activity of these sectors on our A, B, 
and C dimensions. In the following we combine information 
gained in our interviews with our assessment of industry 
characteristics to draw a differentiated picture of motives for 
engaging in TBA and the likelihood (evidence) of doing so. 
3. Sector characteristics and propensity to engage in TBA. 
We look at four industries namely 
* automobiles 
* textiles 
* telecommunications 
* machine tools 
to assess what, if anything, pushes them to engage in TBA. 
The structural elements which are singled out are 
* economics of production 
* market and marketing 
* research and development 
*industry structure (concentration etc.) 
The effects of structural industry characteristics on TBA 
behavior have been coded in terms of the basic graph, i.e. 
A = TBA despite cost of Non-Europe 
B = TBA worthwhile but discouraged by Non-Europe 
C = TBA not worthwhile 
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1. Automobiles 
Production 
a. Global overcapacity (+- 5 million units)i 
ditto in EEC (+- 2 million)i 
strong competitive pressures on European mfsi 
stagnant/declining demand prospects, hence 
no pressure for capacity expansion via 
TBA. 
b. Great importance of economies of scale. 
Rationalisation in the sense of elmination of 
overcapacity can be linked with 
rationalisation of production lines, use of 
common components, etc. Hence 
TBA in the network sense exists, but 
internalising costs of Non-Europe. 
Non-Europe in company law and industrial 
policy 
prevent rationalisation-type TBA. 
c. Exploiting 
factor cost differentials no longer 
motive for TBA in Europei 
there is even a slight bias towards high-wage 
countries except for low-tech components. 
Marketing 
TBA to overcome nationalist NTBs of little 
importance except in Iberia. But also in 
Britain fleet-buying creates some bias 
towards local production. 
R & D 
a. Genuinely innovative, high-risk and high-
cost research rather rarei hence 
little pressure for TBA from this 
quarter for mass producers. 
b. Development costs very high to optimise 
package of known, or bought-in new 
technologies. On the other hand, autos still 
have recognisably "national" characteristics. 
Moderate pressure for TBA likely to 
rise. 
X 
X 
X 
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c.Innovations come largely from suppliers 
(new materials; production technology; 
electronic regulation. 
Considerable, but non-integrated, R&D 
cooperation. 
Non-Europe prevents more intensive 
TEA/rationalisation. 
Industrial Structure 
a. Automobalie industry characterised by very 
large firms with management resources to 
engage in Europe- (and world-wide) TBA. But 
cooperation limited to suppliers, or 
con~onent-specific cooperation with 
competitors, 
internalising heavy costs of Non-Europe. 
b. Dominance of one, or at most two 
nationally owned mass producers in each 
Member States leads firms themselves, and 
public authorities to 
avoid cross-frontier mergers. 
(Note that the situation is slightly 
different in the trucking industry where one 
integrated European multinational - IVECO -
exists.) 
2. Textiles 
Production 
a. World-wide, and, to a lesser degree, EEC-
wide overcapacityi poor profitability because 
of competition; hence 
no motive for expansion-motivated TBA. 
b. Economies of scale important in industrial 
and other non-fashion textiles; with added 
need to reduce overcapacities this has led to 
fair degree of Europe-wide TBA. 
High proportion of specialised, highly 
productive SMEs with at most local business 
links and OECD-wide markets; for these 
no reason for Euro-wide TBA. 
c. Rising capital intensity diminishes 
importance of factor price differentials, 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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except in extreme cases (Portugal). On the 
other hand, the re-location process from NICs 
to fully industrialised countries, encouraged 
by a combination of protectionism (MFA) and 
increasing capital intensity, suggest 
untapped TBA potential by parents in high-
wage countries (D, B, NL). These marginal 
advantages sensitive to the cost of Non-
Europe. 
Marketing 
Access to customers (industrial users; 
wholesalers) well established. Low incidence 
of NTBs. Direct exports possible, with at 
most marketing subsidiaries required; hence 
weak incentives for TBA. 
Research and Development 
Innovations tend to come from capital goods 
suppliers. Hence 
few incentives for producers themselves 
to reap economies of scale with other 
producers. 
Some incentives for TBA 
between manufacturers and capital goods 
suppliers. 
Industrial structure 
The Community textiles industry is 
characterised by a dualist structure with 
large companies (mostly for industrial 
textiles, carpets etc. on the one hand, and a 
number of specialised medium-sized (Germany) 
and even small (Italy) firms on the other. 
Large companies have the resources to 
engage in TBA; 
small companies have little incentive. 
X 
X 
{f.) 
X 
XI 
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Telecommunications 
(incl. office automation) 
Production 
a. Strong global growth of demand with 
matching growth of capacity. Little 
overcapacity as such (except in central 
switching), but prospect of NIC, US, and 
Japanese inroads in global market provide 
few incentives for capacity expansion 
in Europe through TBA. 
b. Economies of scale on the one hand, and 
trend towards systems solutions (hard & 
software) provide 
strong incentives for cooperation 
Cost of Non-Europe very high (standards; type 
approval; border controls; COCOM). 
NTBs, notably in the procurement market 
provides incentives for TBA, but nation-
specific product development, on balance 
discourages TBA. 
Marketing 
a. Trend towards systems-solutions for both 
private and public customers requires local 
presence. Thus in spite of high costs of Non-
Europe 
clear evidence of growing TBA. 
b. Procurement discrimination continues to 
favour companies which have not lost their 
national character; hence Non-Europe presents 
risks of forming truly integrated 
companies. 
Research and Development 
High speed of innovation. R&D both expensive 
and risky. Includes "basic research". Hence 
very strong pressures towards TBA. 
On the other hand, R&D cooperation still too 
much at the long end of the market ("basic") 
with 
unused potential for rationalisation 
(TBA) in product development 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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Industrial structure 
Large companies predominate, hence 
management resources allow TBA 
but most have formal or informal role as 
national champions 
hampering farreaching 
integration/rationalisation. 
Mechanical engineering 
Production 
a. Moderate growth of global demand; European 
industry competitive in world markets. Few 
economies of scale in specialised plant and 
machine tool market can be obtained in 
production as such. (D, I). 
Even in the standard end of the market (F, 
GB) plant economies of scale not very 
important. Hence 
few incentives to enlarge production 
units through TBA. 
b. Improved production economies can be 
reached by vertical cooperation with 
component suppliers; and by completing 
product ranges by exchanges/specialisation 
with competitors; hence 
some (and growing) trend towards TBA. 
But high sensitivity to Non-Europe (norms; 
border problems) lead to 
unused potential for TBA. 
Specialised producers of customer specific 
products form a large proportion among both 
large and small firms in the industry with 
little incentive for TBA. 
Marketing 
Strong element of "service" in industry 
offering "solutions" rather than products 
alone. Hence TBA needed for finishing 
products locally; adapting it to local 
standards; and after-sales service in 
general. Hence 
incentives for TBA. 
lx) 
X 
X 
i 
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Research and Development 
a. Short-term, planned product development 
adapting new but known technology 
predominates over lengthy and risky "basic" 
research (which is often done in public 
laboratories). Hence 
weak incentives for TBA 
within the industry itself. This may change, 
however, if innovation goes beyond 
electronics to incorporate lasers, new 
materials, bio-technology. 
b. Usual cooperative links between either 
machinery manufacturer and customer; or with 
component suppliers (sensors; chips, 
software). Here are 
potential incentives of Euro-TBA, 
although strictly speaking not within sector 
itself. 
Industry Structure 
Company size ranges from small to medium-
large. Given absence of standardised 
production runs even for larger firms 
supplying industrial plant, TEA would involve 
very considerable management costs. The 
smaller companies, which predominate, lack 
management resources altogether. Uncertainty 
as to quality and delivery discourage pre-TBA 
contractual experiments. 
lt&c 
X 
X 
Given our ultimate objective to reach some numerical estimate 
of integral A we had to turn the qualitative assessments in 
the above sector analyses into quantitative estimates. These 
estimates, and the later multiples based on them, should be 
treated with the greatest caution: they can do little more 
than structure our understanding of diversity and prevent us 
from making blanket assertions on the role of TBA "for 
industry". 
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Table 3: Cooperation and potential 
Industry TBA potential TBA efficient local 
pbarma 
30% 40% 30% 
telec. 
40% 40% 20% 
auto 
30% 40% 30% 
auto (US 
-----------------
owned) 60% 10% 30% 
textiles, 
machinery 10% 30% 60% 
With these assumptions our standard graph can be drawn in 
three illustrative versions. 
Cost of non-Europe: sectoral profiles 
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CP.Ol!P m 
We can now quantify more precisely the contents of integral 
A, which is 
cost of TBA x total turnover x % of turnover involved in 
TBA 
Since we are ultimately interested in the costs for industry 
as a whole, we do not make this calculation separately for 
our fiv-e sectors, but for three groups, "assigning" each two 
to four- digit indus~ry to one of_ the three groups. Since the 
EEC does not ye-t publish very detailed- industrial statistic_s, 
and only on a country basis, we took our-data from the OECD's 
Industrial Structure Statistics 1984 (1986). That, however, 
omits countries such as France, so that we make our 
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calculation for a single country, Germany. 
Group I 
3522 pharmaceuticals 
3825 Office & computing machin. 
3832 Communications equipment 
3841 shipbuilding 
3842 railroad equipm. 
3845 aircraft 
Total 
Group IT 
31 Food etc. 
35 Chemicals (exc.351,3522) 
3833 Electrical appliances 
384 Transport ( exc.see I) 
Total 
Group ill 
32 Textiles etc. 
33 Wood products 
34 Paper etc. 
351 Industrial che.micals 
36 Non-Metalic Min.Prod. 
37 Basic Metal Ind. 
381 Metal products 
382 Machinery ( exc.3825) 
383 Elec.machinery ( exc.3832) 
and 3833) 
385 Professional goods 
39 "Other" 
Total 
19 billion DM (rounded) 
15 
55 
8 
1 
9 
107 
172 
200 
15 
152 
539 
66 
36 
57 
106 
40 
90 
80 
142 
63 
16 
8 
704 
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The integrals A thus become: 
Group I 
35% x 107 = 37; 37 x 9% (cost ofTBA) = 3.4 billion DM 
Group II 
30% X 539 = 162; 162 X 6% = 
Group III 
10% X 704 = 74; 74 X 1.7% = 
Total manufacturing 
9.7 billion DM 
1.3 billion DM 
14.5 billion DM 
Scaling up these results to the Community level needs taking 
J 
account of the relatively large share of manufactures in 
German output; the relative strength of specialised (group 
III) sectors and weakness of some group II industries like 
electrical appliances, etc. In addition, the "military 
industrial complex", which belongs into the high-cost group 
I, is largely hidden in groups II and III. On the other hand, 
making more precise calculations on the four-digit level for 
all countries would be tantamount to creating a false 
illusion of precision for what are, after all, pyramidal 
guesstimates. 
Nevertheless, we feel that a loss of 30 billion ECU for the 
Community as a whole is a conservative estimate of losses 
incurred in that part of manufacturing industry engaged in 
TBA. To· this must be added the contents of integral B, i.e. 
the non-realised TBA benefits.to which we turn in the next 
chapter. 
Before doing so it may be useful to calculate from the give~ 
German statistics the implications of our judgement regarding 
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sectoral involvement in TBA; i.e. to estimate which 
proportion of manufacturing industry is 
actually engaged in TBA (the Y-axis of integral A, 
prevented from doing so (y-axis of integral B); and 
for whom this aspect of Non-Europe is irrelevant (C). 
This calculation suggests that from a total manufacturing 
turnover of 1350 billion DM 
256 billion, or 
472 billion, or 
621 billion, or 
19% are actually engaged in TBA; 
35% are prevented from doing so; and 
46% are not candidates at all. 
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Chapter V THE COST TO THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY 
We turn in this last chapter to integral B in our basic graph, 
i.e. the cost to Europe of transborder business activity which 
is discouraged altogether because of obstacles. This 
(opportunity) cost must be some inverse function of the 
benefits of transborder business activity. So the more upbeat 
formulation of the question asked in this chapter could be: If 
more obstacles were removed, what (further) contribution could 
TBA make to the prosperity and integration of the European 
economy? 
In what follows we stress mainly the benefits of TBA. This does 
not imply that the "classical" objections to business 
cooperation which were stressed in the introduction are 
presumed to be invalidated: collusion and other forms of anti-
competitive behaviour may reduce welfare; slow down 
technological innovation; and lead to firms which are too large 
to respond quickly to the economic environment. If we ignore 
these dangers here we do so partially in order to simplify 
exposition; and partially because - irrespective of what theory 
and past empirical evidence suggest - we are persuaded that the 
contemporary context of industrial evolution is rather unique: 
First, as we will suggest in our analysis below of 
"networking", industry is experimenting with new forms of 
organisation which overcome many of the drawbacks of large 
size. Secondly, we will argue, only TBA can break down certain 
structural and political obstacles to the Completion of the 
Internal Market, without which mere liberalisation will 
partially fail. Thirdly, Europe is exposed, -as never beforE, to 
competition from world-scale firms. Fourthly, technical change 
is pushing portions of the activities of mature industries in 
the infant industry category. The significance of this latter 
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point will become clearer in the following analysis. The graph 
below illustrates two dimensions of change. 
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1. Networking: from market to contract 
The following analysis may seem to shift the ground of the 
study which, so far, has stressed the cost of non-Europe to 
(tightly) integrated European management. But the looser forms 
of TBA which will be discussed here share many of the problems 
of integrated operations. For one thing, the legal/financial 
links between networking companies are often indistinguishable 
from those of integrated operations: equity links are common, 
even if their function is different. 
To understand the contemporary significance for the 
modernisation of the European economy of certain forms of 
transborder business activity we need to make what may seem an 
) 
overly academic digression on new emerging pattern of 
"industrial" organisation. The word "industrial" is set in 
quotationmarks, because the "soft" inputs into the generation 
of value-added are increasingly marginalising the "hard" 
inputs. 
The exchange of goods and services on an arms-length and ad hoc 
basis, i.e. "trade" in a text-book sense, between independent 
firms in two different countries, is becoming the exception 
rather than the rule: Contractual relationships between links 
in the "chain of value added" are becoming an essential feature 
of the modern economy. An abbreviated illustration of the 
concept of the chain of value-added (used mostly in French 
writings) is given below. 
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THE CHAIN OF VALUE ADDED 
SEQUENTIAl. LI!'<X" LATERAL LINKS 
(apply to cJ.ch sequential lin.lc) 
S&T 
I 
R&D 
I 
RD&.D 
I 
DESIGN 
I 
SOFIWA.lli: DEVELOP~IE"1 FINAi'-iCE 
I 
CO~WO~c~1PRODCCTIO~ TECHi'aCAI.. CONSUL TlNG 
I 
ORGA,'-.lSATION OF PRODCCITO)< MARKET RESE'\RCH 
I 
ASSEMBLY SALES 
I 
D£STRIBUTION 
I 
MA .. tU<ETING 
I 
CuSTOMER SERVICE 
The links between these elements of the "production" process 
are conventionally assumed to be either formed hy the 
hierarchic/bureaucratic organisation internal to the firm; or 
through ad hoc, arms-length market relations between firms. 
This pattern is fact being replaced by a new flexibility in 
which the distinction between the internal and the external 
division of labour in enterprises is blurred. At its most 
extreme, for instance, a component supplier or software 
dpartment within a firm may have very similar relationships 
with either other departments of the same firm, its own 
suppliers of inputs, its (own) outside clients and indeed with 
competitors to the firm. What is left is an interactive network 
where- specific functions, or tasks, are carried out under 
conditions of (reciprQcal)- control which ma_y vary for each 
technology, product, market, or input, whether-material or of 
services. 
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Some, like Bressand, have linked this phenomenon predominantely 
to the informaticsjtelematics revolution which suppresses 
traditional constraints of time and distance. 1 Others stress 
the globalisation of markets on the one hand, and_increased 
international competition on the other. 
On the one hand, globalisation opens opportunities of access to 
resources - technology, manpower, finance - which overtax a 
centralised firms capacity. Frequently, firms can neither 
internalise the new opportunities within their own direct 
control, nor manage the information needed for operations in a 
complex and multifacetted environemnt. A recent OECD report 
} speaks of the "rising marginal cost of internal coordination" 
when firms venture into new areas.2 
Global competition forces firms towards (real) product 
differentiation, thus breaking the mold of mass production; it 
forces them into a technology race where they must settle for 
partial monopolies within alliances; and it forces them to be 
"present" in many markets at the lowest cost. In short, firms 
have to optimise the conflicting claims of flexibility and 
control; and of differentation on the one hand and global 
market power and economies of scale on the other. 
Prof. Bianchi of Nomisma, Bologna, makes many of these points 
in an as yet unpublished comparative study of the re-
organisation of FIAT on the one hand, and small-firm industrial 
networks of the Prato type - as complemented by the global 
marketing function of Beneton on the other.3 
In both cases, the distinction between the firms's external and 
inte:i::-pal division of labour is blurred, with more or less 
autonomous units agreeing on the specifications of their 
respective jobs (interfaces) and left to get on with it. Th~s 
may mean that components suppliers make suggestions for the 
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design of the final product; independent technology centers are 
used by units at all stages of production, and even marketing. 
Typically, the equivalent of agents, brokers, or franchisers 
organise relationships in the design-production-marketing 
process, whether inside a firm, within "industrial districts", 
or among firms operating globally. 
The place of transborder business activity (TBA) in this 
flexibility can be represented in the following table: the 
international dimension appears if we replace the general term 
"cooperation" with "networking-type TBA", and "armslength" with 
the term "trade". Read in this way the table suggest that for 
each of hundreds of elements a firm must make an optimising 
decision of the type suggested above, i.e. control vs 
flexibility. 
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Technology acquisition 
T1 (basic) 
T2 
T3 
PTr (product technology) 
·PT2 (production techno!.) 
Production 
Pr-3-.;5 
P346-350 
PJ.SI-354 
P356-357 
Input procurement 
Raw m2.terials 
Rr 
Rz 
R3 
R4 
Semi finished 
Capital goods 
Cr 
c1 
CJ 
~ 
Services 
Sr (fi.ncnce) 
S:2 
s3 
S4 
M:1rketing 
Pr 
Pz 
P3 
p4 
Ps 
P6 
Tr 
T2 
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Table 4 
COOPERATION L'l COMPANY STRt\TEGY 
Preferred mode of operation 
in hous~ 
R,D&D 
R&D 
traditional 
(vertical integration) 
(e.g.; ste::~ auto:robots) 
ov,.n cash flow 
mvn distribution 
cooperation 
R&D 
R&D 
joint venture 
subsidiary 
supply contract 
joint purchasing 
longterm contract 
joint purchasing 
joint development 
subsidiary 
house bank 
venture capital 
marketing agreement 
joint venture 
marketing subsidiary 
frcnchising 
licensing 
arms length 
pater1t/lic::nsing 
open market 
off shelf 
e2pital m2.rk::t 
age:2t 
pate::J.t 
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The table illustrates the fact that a firm may choose a 
different organisational solution to the aquisition of each 
basic technology (Tl, T2) or production technology (PT3, etc.); 
may choose to produce. most goods in house (Pl- P 345), but 
choose to produce some in coooperation with others; buy its 
inputs on the open market, or integrate vertically (e.g. a 
cmputer company buys a software house; an aluminium processor a 
bauxite mine), or again have a long-term relationship with 
producers of inputs (e.g. an automobile company with car 
component suppliers); develop its production machinery itself 
(robots made by car companies; plant produced by chemical 
companies), buy it of the shelf( typical for textile 
producers), or develop it jointly with a supplier (advanced 
industrial textiles); procure finance capital on the open 
market or through an organic link with a holding, house.bank, 
j 
etc. 
Academic studies of international cooperation are full of 
illustrations of networks between different firms, looking 
ominously like giant spiderwebs. 4 Representations of this kind 
are often taken as proof of concentration, with the networking 
company appearing to have acquired vast influence. This is at 
least in part a misunderstanding, since weak control is a 
precondition for obtaining the benefits of networking: for 
these benefits depend on independent market responses by the 
constituent parts. 
What does this view of an emerging new industrial organisation 
tell us about the value of cooperation - and hence the cost of 
obstacles? 
Clearly, business cooperation, and-by extension TBA, emerges as 
the single most important "institutional" instrument, witho'!t 
which the new dynamic flexbility made possible by "networking" 
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remains limited to intra-firm reforms. The economic loss to the 
firm for being deprived of the cooperation option in its 
strategic mix is not adequately circumscribed with the term 
efficiency. 
Flexibility is not only a low-cost, low-risk option, but may be 
an indispensible precondition for staying in the market at all: 
for gaining speedy access to technology, information, and know-
how; for the speed of reacting to change; for a competitive 
presence in ever more specialised markets and market segements. 
One of the consequences may be the demise of the classic 
multinational. As Olivetti's de Benedetti puts it 
"le concept de multinationale est d~pass~. Le succ~s ne 
peut aujourd'hui etre atteint que par des alliances qui 
vous donnent simultan~ment acc~s en toute part du march~ 
global." 5 
To sum up this general point: Cooperation between fairly 
autonomous, geographically and functionally specialised 
economic units in "networks", provides a combination of 
strategic control and flexibility, and hence efficient short-
term market responsiveness which is becoming the essence of 
modern business organisation. As an alternative to both 
centralised management and arms-length trade, it is an 
instrument for coping with two features of the contemporary 
economy: the globalisation of markets; and the speed of 
technological change. 
Both lead to information overload. Thus it may become difficult 
for-central management to know what technology is available at 
the_production and product level in each of its hundreds of 
specialities; and where to sell "surplus" -_technology which is 
generated internally. 
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The information problem caused by technological and geographic 
(market) complexity is directly reflected in another cost, i.e. 
transaction costs. Although networking, even among equity 
linked firms, always involves negotiation on prices and 
specifications, these can be routinised in long-standing 
relationships with built-in elements of mutual trust. In this 
latter context one sometimes speaks of the "hostage function" 
of minority share-holdings. 
Another, frequently observed, pattern is for two large firms to 
pool risks, and achieve economies of scale by developing or 
producing a component or other input, or sharing a service such 
as marketing. This form is often referred to as "strategic 
alliances". While it may have more than its share of anti-
competitive dangers, it does provide a highly capital-saving 
way for firms to achieve world-competitive technology and 
scale; and to extend their market presence geographically so as 
to reap general economies of scale. 
Last but not least, given the known hesitations of companies to 
engage in arms-length technology transfer (patent sales; 
licensing) which would compromise monopoly rents, cooperation -
which allows such transfers (often on a barter basis) - tends 
to increase the diffusion of technology. 
Quid of European-wide cooperation? External networking is 
particularly important in cases where 
* central management lacks the information for dealing with 
all productive assets directly; 
* would 0therwise be discouraged by the risks (uncertainty) of 
a full-scale presence to go beyond arms-length market 
relationships, but 
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* needs to have the security, and minimal control required for 
a long- term and effective presence in a "market" which it 
cannot achieve through arms length ad hoccery. 
While these remarks are valid for any international "presence", 
they are particularly relevant for Europe. 
For one thing, the "information" needed to operate in Europe is 
particularly costly to acquire relative to the pay-off for each 
individual country, especially as regards the smaller ones. The 
same "investment" in learning to cope with a "foreign" business 
environment made for the US yields a much larger pay-off in 
terms of market access for both sales and acquisition 
(technology). Moreover, the technology "gradient" tends 1to be 
larger when cooperating with both Japan and the United States, 
creating larger incentives to overcome the threshold of heavy 
front-loaded entry costs. From an economic point of view, 
however, the sum of the literally tens of thousands of more 
marginal technological improvements which are available, but 
remain unused, within the European market, may be as decisive 
for competitivity as the publicised hi-tech deficiencies in 
selected areas of micro-electronics etc. remedied by trans-
atlantic or pacific TBA. Yet given the lower technology 
gradient in Europe, even small obstacles to TBA may discourage 
companies from diversifying sources of, and markets for, their 
technology. 
At the same time, given the globalisation of competition, 
meeting that competition successfully on the most favourable 
ground, the European home market, is a precondition for 
success. This familiar argument - for a trading market - i_s 
doubly valid for transborder business cooperation in Europe; 
networking can add the element of flexibility and accurate 
market response on which dynamic competitivity depends. 
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The micro-level effects of network-type TBA are linked to 
specific macro effects. Information cost reduction and risk 
reduction combine to increase potential investment 
opportunities, hence raise total investment in the economy. 
This, at least, would be the conclusion of applying 
Schumpeterian growth theory, with its stress on opportunities 
for new products and/or new production technology as the true 
long-term motor of growth to our analysis of the benefits of 
networking. 
More narrowly, capital saving increases the overall 
productivity of capital. Capital saving, we saw, results from 
· several properties of networking-type TBA. On one level, it 
results from the de-coupling of "dedicated" input-ouput, 
I 
relations on the chain of value-added: peaks and troughs of 
demand and supply can be evened out by recourse to alternative 
markets and suppliers. Networking can also save heavy front-
loaded capital investment associated with developing a new 
technology or product from scratchi or to expand into a 
hitherto unfamiliar market. These cost-saving properties again 
translate into a behavioral, Schumpeterian variable, i.e. 
innovative behavior, since cost reduction equals risk 
reduction, making otherwise marginal opportunities more 
attractive. 
2. Business expansion 
While virtually all larger businesses today engage in some form 
of networking, the creation of an integrat~d European economy 
also requires more robust forms of TBA. These involve the 
extension of direct control from the management in the firm in 
one country over productive resources in another. 
141 -
- 93 -
The wholly-owned subsidiary, whether greenfield or the result 
of a take-over, is the typical instrument of expansion. Mergers 
are either a polite circumlocution of the same thing; or, more 
rarely, involve a genuine centralisation of two centers of 
control. 
Business expansion is economically beneficial if it asserts 
competitive advantages of a firm more quickly and more 
effectively than is possible by trade alone. These competitive 
advantages may lie in technology and/or production know-how; 
management know-how; marketing skills, etc. 
In theory trade, i.e. exports by firms having such advantages, 
will also serve to deplace inefficient competitors, with the 
winner reaping the economies of scale of the large market. In 
practice, however, this process is slow, with the eventual 
losers staying in the market while running down their financial 
and technological assets. More importantly, adjustment may be 
inhibited by countervailing national subsidies and other forms 
of local protection. 
This points to the single most important task of transborder 
"business expansion" for the completion of the Internal Market: 
the rationalisation of industry. Overcapacity is a typical 
feature of too much of European industry. It exists both in 
mature industries whose adjustment is delayed by national 
policies; and, occasionally, in high-tech industries fostered 
by other national policies. Equally, the two ills of Europe's 
R&D effort: duplication of national programmes; and 
preferential national procurement, will not disappear with 
legislation, but only when th~ nationality of the firms 
themselves will be sufficiently confused to make nonsense of 
national preference. No one ~n Europe can buy a national 
Airbus. 
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The difference between networking and business expansion is 
illustrated by the automobile industry. All manufacturers and 
component suppliers are cooperating; i.e. they are situated in 
the upper triangle of figure 3. Partial economies of scale in 
R&D and manufacture (e.g. engines) are achieved. But virtually 
all are in the lower triangle as regards business expansion. 
Rationalisation has taken place within the national context. 
A 
Figure 3 
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In practice, "networking" and expansion are often present 
simultaneously in business links, with the relative emphasis on 
de-centralisation and control shifting according to the 
strategic necessities of a technology (maturity) and a mark~t. 
Note that the nature of the equity link between two units is 
not the criterion for judging whether we are observing 
"networking" or "expansion". In the former case, equity serves 
a "hostage" function to re-assure both partners that contracts 
are carried out faithfully; and stable over the medium term. It 
also increases their overall level of information about the 
partner. In "expansion", on the other hand, the potential for 
equity to exercise full control are being used. 
To sum up, tran~border busine~s acti~ity_ is a pre-condition for 
the functioning of a modern exchange economy. Its relationsgip 
to the overall 1992 project is therefore one of an accelerator 
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or inhibitor of the positive effects, both static and dynamic, 
expected from trade and services liberalisation in general. As 
such it is a parameter to be put before the entire welfare 
function established for the 1992 project. 
In turn, the likelihood of TBA increasing beyond present levels 
not only depends on the realisation of the White Paper's 
targets for company law, but on advances in the liberalisation 
and de-regulation of trade and services. 
Some readers of earlier drafts of this study have interpreted 
its results as proving the socially regressive nature of easier 
TBA in Europe. Rationalisation, an obvious primary effect of 
TBA, means increased unemployment; moreover firms will grow 
bigger and more powerful within a relatively weak context of 
socio-political control. Both fears are to some extent 
justified. But resource saving - including labour - is at the 
heart of the economic "welfare" benefits of any liberalisation, 
including trade itself. One cannot be in favour of the trade-
liberalisation part of the Internal Market agenda without 
welcoming TBA which is, as we argued, an institutional pre-
condition for the effectiveness of market integration. 
Moreover, much of the rationalisation effect concerns 
deadweight administrative costs, and the R&D sector of firms, 
binding highly skilled (and high-cost) resources which could be 
put to more productive use. 
As regards the fears of weak socio-political control (which 
dominated EEC rule making for business in the 1970s), that 
control is bound to be stronger, and have a chance to grow, in 
a_European context. The alternative to Euro-wide TBA is not the 
status-quo, but weak "national" firms linking up-with ~trong 
non-European partners which can exploit residual national 
protectionism, including subsidies, in a Europe which remains 
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economically and technologically balcanised. 
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